Fordham Law Review
Volume 83 Volume 83
Issue 3 Volume 83, Issue 3

Article 8

2014

Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation
James W. Coleman
University of Calgary

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1357 (2014).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol83/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

ARTICLES
IMPORTING ENERGY,
EXPORTING REGULATION
James W. Coleman*
This Article identifies and addresses a growing contradiction at the heart
of United States energy policy. States are the traditional energy regulators
and energy policy innovators—a role that has only grown more important
without a settled federal climate policy. Federal regulators and market
pressures, however, increasingly demand integrated national and
international energy markets. Deregulation, the rise of renewable energy,
the shale revolution, and new sources of motor fuel precursors like crude
and ethanol have all increased interstate energy trade.
This Article shows how integrated national energy markets are driving
states to regulate imported fuel and electricity based on how it was
produced elsewhere. That is, states that import energy are now exporting
their energy regulations to address production in their trading partners.
But exported regulation has its own problems: it threatens to splinter
interstate markets, undercutting the federal push for integrated and efficient
energy markets, and it violates the U.S. Constitution’s dormant Commerce
Clause. Indeed, these innovative exported regulations are now caught up in
litigation across the country.
This Article argues that, to preserve the state role, while also
maintaining a national energy market, Congress should empower the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to immunize nondiscriminatory
state laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny if, and only if, they do not
threaten to splinter interstate energy markets. The Article considers how
these federal regulators might assess state energy laws in three salient
areas: regulation of (1) imported electricity, (2) imported fuel, and
(3) energy export and supply chains.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a critical moment for energy policy in the United States. Over the
past five years, increased production of both fossil fuels and renewable
power, along with increasingly integrated markets in fuels and electricity,
have transformed national energy markets and created skyrocketing demand
for transport and transmission infrastructure.1 In the coming months and
years, regulators and companies will make decisions that will have a
profound effect on the nation’s energy system for a generation, which is
also the critical window for addressing climate change.2 The divided
federal government has not been able to settle on a response to this
challenge which has made the states’ traditional role as laboratories of
democracy for energy policy increasingly important.3
States have responded by adopting renewable power standards, cap-andtrade systems, coal-power phase-outs, and low-carbon fuel standards.4
1. See infra Part I.
2. Kelly Levin, World’s Carbon Budget to Be Spent in Three Decades, WORLD RES.
INST. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/09/world’s-carbon-budget-be-spentthree-decades.
3. Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate
Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379, 401 (2009).
4. See James Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87,
103 (2014) (state cap-and-trade); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L.
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These climate regulations all respond to increasingly national energy
markets by scrutinizing fuel and electricity imported from other states and
countries and requiring that these energy products be produced by lowcarbon methods even when production occurs elsewhere.5 That is, states
are exporting their regulations to cover production of energy commodities
in other states and countries that are part of global energy supply chains.
Climate change gives states a compelling motive to regulate energy
production outside of their borders because greenhouse gases emitted
during production have the same impact on the climate whether or not they
are emitted within the regulating state.6 If states were only to address instate energy production, emissions may shift to nonregulating jurisdictions
entirely and thus negate the intended climate benefit of the importing state’s
regulation.7 Although all environmental and labor regulations could push
industries to other states or countries, climate change regulation is unique
because there is no benefit to regulating if emissions merely shift
elsewhere. A state that loses jobs because it imposes a strict water quality
law or on-the-job safety standard at least gains cleaner water or safer
workers. A state that loses industry due to climate regulation may be left
with nothing. When the industry moves to another state, its greenhouse gas
emissions will still have the same effect on the shared climate. Therefore,
the fundamental challenge of climate regulation is how to ensure that
increased regulation does not merely shift greenhouse gas emitting
industries to nonregulating jurisdictions:
climate policy and
competitiveness policy are necessarily intertwined.
Thus, state
experimentation with exported regulations is a crucial laboratory for
regulators around the world, demonstrating the promise and perils of
leveraging subglobal regulation to address an entirely global dilemma.
These exported energy regulations,8 however, present two serious
problems. First, under the U.S. Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause,
REV. 1801, 1809 (2012) (renewable power standards); see also California Low Carbon Fuel
Standard, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2012) (low-carbon fuel standard); Minnesota
Next Generation Energy Act, MINN. STAT. § 216H.03 (2011), invalidated by North Dakota v.
Heydinger, No. 11-CV-3232 SRN/SER, 2014 WL 1612331 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014) (coal
phaseout). For more detail, see infra notes 66–81 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part II.
6. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY
QUESTIONS 10–11 (2001).
7. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 106–07 (describing how this phenomenon, known as
“leakage,” undercuts incentives to regulate in other countries); see also Robert N. Stavins,
Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global
Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 317–19 (describing modes of leakage).
8. Exported regulations must not be confused with traditional environmental
regulations that apply to in-state emissions but indirectly motivate action through the
“California effect” in which out-of-state manufacturers upgrade their entire production line
to the more efficient models demanded by one state’s regulation. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING
UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 248 (1995)
(using the term “California effect” to describe how California’s regulatory innovation has
spread to other states through national trade). The paradigmatic example of this effect is
California automobile efficiency standards that drove manufacturers across the country and
the world to manufacture more efficient vehicles. Id.; see also Anu Bradford, The Brussels
Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2013) (describing spread of EU measures on hazardous
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states may not tax or restrict imports based on how they were created in
other states,9 even if failing to do so will undercut state regulation.10 So
exported regulations are unconstitutional under a conventional dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. As a result, many of these regulations are
currently embroiled in lawsuits around the country.11 Second, these
regulations threaten to break up emerging national and international energy
markets, undoing federal policies designed to integrate domestic energy
markets.12 Splintered markets would forgo the efficiency benefits promised
by integrated markets, squandering the opportunity to provide consumers
with lower, less volatile energy prices.13
This Article argues that these problems can be mitigated—and exported
state energy regulation can be reconciled with emerging interstate energy
markets—if Congress authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to supervise state laws that regulate interstate energy
transactions. The dormant Commerce Clause is merely an inference from
congressional silence, so federal regulators may immunize state regulations
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.14 Finally, federal energy
regulators have expertise that would help them judge whether state energy
regulation would endanger integrated energy markets.15 Thus, FERC is
well positioned to authorize or preempt state regulation of out-of-state
energy production.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the increasing
integration of markets for electricity, fossil fuels, and motor fuels. Part II
waste); Richard B. Stewart et al., Building Blocks for Global Climate Protection, 32 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 341, 378–80 (2013) (giving these effects the name “dominant actor strategies”).
But those regulations applied to the characteristics of the product sold within California, not
the process by which it was made. By contrast, exported energy regulations do not apply to
any characteristic of gasoline or electricity—those commodities are identical no matter how
they are produced; instead the regulations prescribe how electricity and gasoline may be
produced. See infra notes 83, 98 and accompanying text.
9. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (“States and
localities may not attach restrictions to . . . imports in order to control commerce in other
States.”); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (stating that regulation is forbidden
by the dormant Commerce Clause if “the practical effect of the regulation is to control
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State”).
10. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); see also C & A Carbone,
511 U.S. at 393 (finding that states may not “extend [their] police power beyond its
jurisdictional bounds”). See generally Douglas Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a
Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621 (2008); Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law
Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State
Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431 (2008).
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See Andrew R. Butters & Daniel F. Spulber, The Evolution of the Market for
Wholesale Power 4, 9 (Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Searle Ctr., Working Paper) (using
volatility as a proxy for grid isolation and explaining that “competition among retail
electricity suppliers helped to reduce markups over the cost of purchased electric power by
improving
marketing
efficiencies
and
lowering
margins”),
available
at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/events/energy/documents/
Butters_Spulber_energy.pdf.
14. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
15. See infra Part III.C.
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explores the state response: exported regulation that takes on energy
extraction and production in other states and countries. Part III makes the
case for modifying the existing dormant Commerce Clause regime that
controls exported regulation and argues that agency review is a more
comprehensive and workable solution to the problem of exported state
regulation. Part IV concludes by briefly exploring how federal regulators
could address three important categories of exported energy regulation:
state regulation of imported electricity, state regulation of imported fuel,
and state regulation of energy export and supply chains.
I. IMPORTING ENERGY: EXPANDING NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
ELECTRICITY AND FUEL MARKETS
From the Roman Empire’s coal trade to ships circling the globe in search
of whale oil, there has always been a global trade in energy. But for many
years, most energy was produced, distributed, and consumed on a relatively
local scale.16 Electricity was produced and distributed by vertically
integrated monopolies that were usually limited to a single state, or even a
single metro area. A single utility operated the power plants that produced
electricity, the transmission lines that relayed that electricity to population
centers, and the distribution lines that brought it to individual consumers.17
Electricity sources were often local as well: coal power was predominantly
near coal-producing regions like Appalachia and Illinois,18 population
centers near mountains were often served by hydroelectricity,19 and oil and
natural gas power was more common in areas where those resources were
plentiful.20 Power sources for heating were often local as well.21 Even

16. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 4, at 1805.
17. Id. at 1806 (“Until recently, most of the industry remained vertically integrated:
most utilities owned large, centralized generation facilities, transmission lines, and
distribution lines and covered an exclusive service territory, delivering electricity to
customers for sales.”).
18. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FUEL COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION AND
ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION (2012), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/fuelelasticities/
pdf/eia-fuelelasticities.pdf (showing that coal makes up the bulk of fuel purchases in the two
regions nearest the Appalachia and the Illinois Coal Basin, which are controlled by the
Midwest Reliability Organization and the ReliabilityFirst Corporation); Electrical Power,
HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE (June 10, 2010), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/
online/articles/dpe01 (providing a historical overview of electrical power in Texas). These
patterns persist but are being altered by increased transportation and new fuel sources. See
infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text.
19. DOUGLAS HALL, IDAHO NAT’L LAB., A STUDY OF UNITED STATES HYDROELECTRIC
PLANT OWNERSHIP 6 (June 2006), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/water/pdfs/doewater11519.pdf (showing greatest hydroelectric capacity in California, Oregon, and Washington).
20. See CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 2005 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REPORT OF
CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICAL GENERATION SYSTEM 25 (2005), http://www.energy.ca.gov
/2005publications/CEC-700-2005-016/CEC-700-2005-016.PDF (“Oil-fired power plant
development began in the late 1930s and peaked in the 1950s.”); U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
Alaska State Profile and Energy Estimates, http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=AK
(last updated June 19, 2014) (Alaska, as a natural gas and oil producer, relies primarily on
electricity generated by natural gas and diesel); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Texas State
Profile and Energy Estimates, http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=TX (Dec. 18,
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crude oil, perhaps the archetypal global commodity, was often produced in
state.22
Over the past decades each of these energy markets has been radically
transformed by new production and transport technologies, resulting in
geographically expanded markets that crisscross jurisdictional boundaries.
The transition has been perhaps most dramatic in electricity markets, where
deregulation and the rise of renewable energy sources far from population
centers have created an increasingly prevalent national electricity market.23
In 1978, Congress and the states began restructuring these markets by
encouraging or requiring vertically integrated utilities to purchase power
from certain non-utilities that operated hydroelectric facilities or could
produce electricity as a byproduct of other industrial activities—so-called
“co-generation” facilities.24 In the 1990s, FERC began a more dramatic
overhaul of the monopoly model, requiring utilities to “wheel”—i.e.,
Transmission and
transmit—power for all electricity producers.25
distribution remained monopolies because of the difficulty of setting up
parallel competing electric grids, but FERC believed that if these
transmission monopolies charged independent power producers fair rates to
deliver power to consumers, then all independent generators could compete
with established utilities in an open market for electricity generation.26

2013) (Texas, the nation’s largest natural gas producer, relies mostly on electricity from
natural gas).
21. JOHN BARTECK, JR., NATURAL RESOURCE, AGRIC. & ENG’G SERV., HEATING WITH
WOOD AND COAL 1 (2003) (describing transitions from local wood as a heating source to
coal delivered by rail and then, at the middle of the twentieth century, to oil and gas using
new distribution systems).
22. For example, as recently as 1994, more than half of the crude oil refined for use in
California came from California. MARGARET SHERIDAN, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CALIFORNIA
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 1–2 (2006), http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2006publications/CEC-600-2006-006/CEC-600-2006-006.PDF. By 2005, California’s share
of California crude had dropped to 37 percent. Id.
23. See Butters & Spulber, supra note 13, at 2 (using electricity pricing data to
“conclude that a national market for wholesale electric power is emerging”); see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 468–69 (2005) (describing progress to date in integrating
regional energy markets); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 772–76 (2008) (describing development of competitive regional
markets in both electricity and natural gas).
24. Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117;
Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in
Regulating the U.S. Electricity Market, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1347–48, 1354–89 (1993)
(describing state regulation in California and the Northeast that required utilities to purchase
power from these non-utilities at above-market rates). Cogeneration facilities can produce
power relatively cheaply as a byproduct of other industrial processes. U.S. Energy Info.
Admin., Today in Energy: Combined Heat and Power Technology Fills an Important
Energy Niche (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8250.
25. Pierce, supra note 23, at 468–79 (describing progress of restructuring, which is
assessed as “Near Complete Success in the Mid-Atlantic Region,” “Partial Success in New
England, New York, and Texas,” and “Failure in California” and “The Rest of the
Country”).
26. Id. at 464–66.
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FERC’s restructuring plans met with only mixed success and many areas
of the country remain dependent on traditional vertically integrated utilities
for electricity. Nevertheless, there has been a gradual trend toward
competitive generation markets, which has resulted in more geographically
First, some regions have developed
integrated power networks.27
integrated, competitive power generation markets, such as the mid-Atlantic
region, the Northeast corridor, and the Midwest.28 Second, as a result of
federal and state policies there has been a large increase in the use of wind
power,29 which often requires interstate transmission because suitable highwind sites are often located far from principal areas of electricity demand
such as cities and manufacturing centers.30 Third, FERC has put pressure
on all states—whether restructured or traditionally regulated—to develop
regionally integrated transmission plans through Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators (ISOs).31 As a
result, most of the country—excluding the Southeast and the Mountain
West—is now incorporated into one of seven RTOs and ISOs.32
Additionally, FERC is working to expand nationally integrated transmission
by pushing neighboring RTOs and ISOs to cooperate,33 and demanding that
states consider the electricity needs of neighboring states when they
respond to transmissions proposals.34 The net result of these efforts is an
emerging integrated national electricity market.35
27. See Shmuel Oren et al., Alternative Business Models for Transmission Investment
and Operation, in DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY C-9
(2002) (describing FERC policy that “widespread interconnection and direct access to the
transmission network will expand the scope of the market and foster market efficiency”).
28. The same is true, to a limited extent, of California. Pierce, supra note 23, at 471–77.
29. In 2012 more wind power capacity was installed than any other power type,
including booming fossil fuel sources such as natural gas. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy
Department Reports: U.S. Wind Energy Production and Manufacturing Reaches Record
Highs, ENERGY.GOV (Aug. 6, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://energy.gov/articles/energy-deptreports-us-wind-energy-production-and-manufacturing-reaches-record-highs (“In 2012, wind
energy became the number one source of new U.S. electricity generation capacity for the
first time—representing 43 percent of all new electric additions.”).
30. Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Wind Resources and Transmission Lines, NREL.GOV,
http://www.nrel.gov/electricity/transmission/images/home_usmap.jpg (last visited Nov. 26,
2014). The greatest average wind speeds are concentrated in the less-populated plains states.
See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, United States: Land-Based and Offshore Annual Average Wind
Speed
at
100
m,
ENERGY.GOV,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wind/images/
wind_speed_map_lg.jpg (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
31. Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L.
REV. 773, 804 & n.128 (2013); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Why FERC Must Mandate
Efficiently Structured Regional ISOs—Now!, 12 ELEC. J. 49 (1999).
32. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy: About 60 percent of the U.S. Electric
Power Supply Is Managed By RTOs, EIA.GOV (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=790.
33. FERC, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18
C.F.R. 35).
34. Id. at 49,871.
35. Denise L. Desautels, Who Should Regulate the Siting of Electric Transmission Lines
Anyway? A Jurisdictional Study, 18 ELEC. J. 11, 12 (2005) (“The restructuring of the electric
industry and subsequent break-up of vertically integrated monopolies created regional and
even national wholesale power markets.”); see also Spence, supra note 23, 772–75
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Fossil fuel markets also have been shaken up by new transport and
production techniques that have combined to displace traditional regional
fuels, and enable export of fuels to distant markets. Wellhead natural gas
prices in the United States rose dramatically from 2002 to 2008, peaking at
$10.79 per thousand cubic feet in July 2008.36 Since then, widespread use
of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing of shale gas formations,
commonly referred to as “fracking,” has unlocked vast new reserves of
natural gas across the continent, pushing wellhead natural gas prices as low
as $1.89 per thousand cubic feet in May 2012.37 This shale gas revolution
has also dramatically expanded the nation’s proven natural gas reserves,
suggesting that natural gas will be plentiful for many years to come.38 As a
result, natural gas power plants have become viable in areas of the country
that previously primarily relied on coal or other power sources.39
This dramatic swing in natural gas prices has led to significant regional
and global price disparities, which has motivated an increasing national and
international trade in natural gas by land and sea.40 During the decade of
peaking natural gas prices, the United States added over 20,000 miles of
natural gas pipelines to connect expanding sources of natural gas
(describing development of competitive regional markets in both electricity and natural gas).
Indeed, energy markets are increasingly international. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note
31, at 780 n.22, 802–803, 811 (2013) (noting that the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation “writes and implements standards intended to guarantee the provision of a
constant and adequate supply of electricity in the United States and several Canadian
provinces”).
36. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, EIA.GOV,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
37. Id.
38. Proven natural gas reserves nearly doubled from 1999 to 2011. U.S. Energy Info.
Admin., U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, EIA.GOV,
www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). Although there has
been serious debate on how long these reserves, standing alone, will last, they certainly
increase the likelihood of natural gas abundance for the coming decades. Chris Nelder, What
the Frack?: Is There Really 100 Years’ Worth of Natural Gas Beneath the United States?,
SLATE (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2011
/12/is_there_really_100_years_worth_of_natural_gas_beneath_the_united_states_.html.
39. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Fracking Addresses All of Our Major Problems,
4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 22, 23 (2013); COMPETITION IN POWER GENERATION
AND ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 4 (“The trend of natural gas displacing
coal was especially evident in the southeastern United States between 2008 and 2009.”);
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy: Ohio’s Fuel Mix for Power Generation Is
Changing, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5030 (last visited
Nov. 26, 2014) (showing increasing use of natural gas in Ohio’s electricity mix); Ken
Silverstein, Coal-Dependent States Get Second Chance with Shale Gas Boom, FORBES (Nov.
14, 2013, 7:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/11/14/coal-dependentstates-get-second-chance-with-shale-gas-boom (describing transition in West Virginia);
Trevor Houser et al., State Contributions to Recent US Emissions Trends, RHODIUM GRP.
(Oct. 28, 2013), http://rhg.com/notes/state-by-state-contributions-to-recent-us-emissionstrends (showing gas displacing coal in Texas, Ohio, Georgia, Indiana, and Alabama).
40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EFFECT OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON
DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS 3 (2012), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe
/pdf/fe_lng.pdf; James Coleman, The Shale ‘Revolution’ Is About Gas Prices and Oil
Production, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (July 17, 2014), http://theenergycollective.com
/energylawprof/432466/shale-revolution-about-gas-prices-oil-production.
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production with natural gas demand.41 Although there is less data available
for recent years, it seems that this building boom has continued: in 2011,
2400 miles of pipeline were added, much of it in regions with significant
fracking activity, such as Texas and the Northeast.42 There is every
likelihood that the pace of pipeline building will continue: in 2013 and
2014, increasing reliance on natural gas for both electricity and heating
created pipeline bottlenecks and price spikes across the country.43
A booming international trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG) has also
emerged. If it cannot be moved by pipeline, natural gas generally must be
liquefied (and therefore condensed) by cooling before it can be transported
overseas. This is an expensive process, but improved technology and
natural gas price disparities have enabled a booming trade in LNG—since
1981, the global LNG trade has doubled every eight years.44
In the decade of high gas prices, U.S. importers sought to build several
new LNG import facilities.45 Now with shale gas driving U.S. prices below
$3 per million British thermal units, and Asian shale gas prices over $15,46
investors have submitted several applications to the Department of Energy
for new LNG export facilities that could ship to Asia.47 The Department of
41. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MAJOR CHANGES IN NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION
CAPACITY 1998–2008 2 (2008), available at http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/fwd
/ngpipelinetc.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (“More than 20,000 miles of new natural gas
transmission pipeline, representing more than 97 billion cubic feet per day of capacity, were
placed in service in the United States over the past 10 years. . . . Much of that growth was
driven by the need to: access new supply sources such as: imports from Canada[;]
expanding production from new natural gas fields.”). Like natural gas prices, the pipeline
boom spiked in 2008 with 3893 miles of new pipeline in that year alone. U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., EXPANSION OF THE U.S. NATURAL GAS PIPELINE NETWORK: ADDITIONS IN 2008 AND
PROJECTS THROUGH 2011 (2009), http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature
_articles/2009/pipelinenetwork/pipelinenetwork.pdf.
42. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Year-in-Review (With Data for 2011),
EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/review/archive/2011 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
43. See Clifford Krauss, Natural Gas Prices Soar As Mercury Plummets, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2014, at B3; see also U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy: December
Natural
Gas
Prices
Spike
in
Boston,
EIA.GOV
(Dec.
6,
2013),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14071.
44. Knut Einar Rosendahl & Eirik Lund Sagen, The Global Natural Gas Market: Will
Transport Cost Reductions Lead to Lower Prices?, 30 ENERGY J. 17, 17 (2009) (noting that
“[o]ver the last decade the costs of LNG have been significantly reduced, more producers
have entered the gas market in general and the LNG market in particular, and the trade
between continents has increased”); INT’L GAS UNION, WORLD LNG REPORT 2011, at 7 fig.1
(2011),
http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page-field_file/LNG%20Report%
202011.pdf.
45. Clifford Krauss, Exports of American Natural Gas May Fall Short of High Hopes,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at B1.
46. ERNST & YOUNG, GLOBAL LNG, WILL NEW DEMAND AND NEW SUPPLY MEAN NEW
PRICING?
13
fig.4
(2013),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global
_LNG_New_pricing_ahead/$FILE/Global_LNG_New_pricing_ahead_DW0240.pdf.
47. EFFECT OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC ENERGY MARKETS,
supra note 40, at 3 (“Unlike the oil market, current natural gas markets are not integrated
globally. In today’s markets, natural gas prices span a range from $0.75 per million British
thermal units (MMBtu) in Saudi Arabia to $4 per MMBtu in the United States and $16 per
MMBtu in Asian markets that rely on LNG imports. Prices in European markets, which
reflect a mix of spot prices and contract prices with some indexation to oil, fall between U.S
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Energy has approved seven of these projects and is reviewing twenty-four
more.48 Until global prices converge, global LNG transport will continue to
increase.49
The abundance of cheap natural gas has also resulted in surplus coal that
now is being exported across the country, and to new markets abroad.50 In
the second quarter of 2009, the United States exported only 13 million short
tons of coal; in the second quarter of 2013, it exported 29.5 million short
tons.51
The increased international trade in fossil fuels for power production has
been matched by an increasingly diverse interstate trade in unconventional
sources of motor fuel precursors such as oil sands, non-corn ethanol,52 and
oil from shale formations.53 For many years, most of the oil in the United
States came from conventional oil production in the United States, Canada,
or the Middle East.54 In recent years, several new sources of motor fuel
have come to the fore. In 2003, Canada’s vast oil sands resources—which
consist of oil mixed with sand and clay—were declared “economically
recoverable,” due to improved extraction techniques and high oil prices,55
and since then U.S. imports of Canadian crude have gradually increased
from 2072 barrels per day in 2003 to 3142 barrels per day in 2013.56
Furthermore, in the last five years, unconventional fracking techniques have
unlocked large volumes of domestic oil from shale in the Bakken formation
and Asian prices. Spot market prices at the U.K. National Balancing Point averaged $9.21
per MMBtu during November 2011.”).
48. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SUMMARY OF LNG EXPORT APPLICATIONS,
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Summary_of_Export_Applications.pdf.
49. Global demand for North American natural gas seems likely to increase as air
quality concerns limit coal-fired power and regulators demand power that, like natural gas,
can easily ramp up and down to complement intermittent power sources like wind and solar.
JOEL DARMSTADTER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER US COAL AND
NATURAL GAS EXPORTS 2–3 (2013), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-IB-13-01.pdf
(explaining how low North American natural gas prices have led to exports to Asia, where
coal is still competitive with gas).
50. Id.
51. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., QUARTERLY COAL REPORT tbl.4 (2014),
http://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/pdf/t4p01p1.pdf (providing monthly data on
U.S. coal exports and imports from 2008 to 2014).
52. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO
2035, at 24 (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012] (“Bitumen production in
Canada and biofuels production mostly from the United States and Brazil are the most
important components of the world’s incremental supply of other liquids from 2010 to 2035
in the Reference case.”).
53. This oil is known as “tight oil” and its production in the Bakken formation of North
Dakota has transformed domestic crude markets. Id. at 2 (“Key results highlighted in
AEO2012 include continued modest growth in demand for energy over the next 25 years and
increased domestic crude oil and natural gas production, largely driven by rising production
from tight oil and shale resources.”).
54. NEELESH NERURKAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41765, U.S. OIL IMPORTS:
CONTEXT AND CONSIDERATIONS 4–5 (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41765.pdf.
55. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CANADA REPORT 3 (2014), http://www.eia.gov/
countries/analysisbriefs/Canada/canada.pdf.
56. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Imports from Canada of Crude Oil and Petroleum
Products,
EIA.GOV,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s
=MTTIMUSCA2&f=A (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
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in North Dakota and the Barnett and Eagle Ford formations in Texas.57
Finally, in the 2007 Renewable Fuel Standard, Congress mandated a
massive expansion in biofuel consumption—asking the EPA to write
regulations that force refiners to sell increasing volumes of biofuels,
eventually reaching 36 billion gallons a year in 2022.58 Although the law
mandates consumption of large volumes of conventional ethanol, it also
requires use of a variety of other advanced biofuels, which in practice
requires growing imports of sugarcane ethanol from Brazil.59
Thus, energy has gone from a model where fuel was purchased from a
limited number of sources and then electricity was consumed and produced
locally, to a model where both fuel and electricity are shipped in rapidly
evolving national and international markets.
II. EXPORTING REGULATION: REGULATING ENERGY PRODUCTION
AND CONSUMPTION IN OTHER STATES AND COUNTRIES
Although there are important federal energy regulations, the fifty states
remain the focus of energy regulation and the most important energy policy
innovators. The states implement federal pollution control standards that
govern areas such as fossil fuel extraction, refining, and power
production.60 They supplement these standards with their own policies that
also affect each stage of energy extraction and production.61 They regulate
electricity prices and reliability and often prescribe the appropriate mix of

57. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 52, at 43 (“The increased variety and
regional availability of certain crude types has created new market dynamics and pricing
relationships that are difficult to capture using existing methods, especially considering the
rapid emergence of ‘tight oil’ production, which, to date, has been substantially different in
quality from the crude oil previously expected to be available to U.S. refineries. For
example, light sweet crude oil sourced from the Bakken shale formation in North Dakota has
been sold to refiners on the Gulf Coast in recent years at a substantial discount relative to
heavier imported crudes, because of limitations in the delivery infrastructure.”).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1)(B)(i)(1) (2012); ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra
note 52, at 24 (“Bitumen production in Canada and biofuels production mostly from the
United States and Brazil are the most important components of the world’s incremental
supply of other liquids from 2010 to 2035 in the Reference case.”).
59. BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22870, WAIVER AUTHORITY
UNDER THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD (RFS) 4 & 6 n.29 (2014),
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS22870.pdf; RANDY SCHNEPF
& BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40155, RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD
(RFS):
OVERVIEW
AND
ISSUES
4
&
n.10,
7,
23–26
(2013),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40155.pdf.
60. See Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 188–89 (2005).
61. For example, states have taken the lead in regulating extraction processes like
natural gas fracking. See JACQUELYN PLESS, NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT AND HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING: A POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE 1–4 (2012), www.ncsl.org/documents/energy
/frackingguide_060512.pdf (noting that “[a]lthough a number of federal regulations govern
the hydraulic fracturing process, states have regulatory primacy on this issue,” and that “[a]t
least 119 bills in 19 states have been introduced this session that address hydraulic
fracturing”).
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power sources.62 They control siting of infrastructure for electricity
transmission and transportation of liquid and solid fuels.63
The states’ role as “laboratories of democracy” for energy policy64 has
grown increasingly prominent over the past decade because the federal
government has been unable to settle on a national energy policy.65 States
have adopted innovative policies that read like a menu of proposals to
transform energy markets—renewable power standards,66 cap-and-trade
systems,67 utility rate decoupling,68 coal-power phaseouts,69 renewable

62. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 31, at 802–03, 806 (describing state role in
regulating mix of power sources and retail energy prices and conditions).
63. Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission
Siting Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (“[S]tates have most of the regulatory
authority in the electricity industry.”); see also Pierce, supra note 23, at 466.
64. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788–89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“States serve as laboratories for the development of new social,
economic, and political ideas. This state innovation is no judicial myth. . . . Utility
regulation itself is a field marked by valuable state invention.”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. E.
Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 489 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Long before the Federal
Government could be stirred to regulate utilities, courageous states took the initiative and
almost the whole body of utility practice has resulted from their experiences.”); see also
David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008); William
W. Buzbee, Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 154, 157 (2007); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 189 (2002).
65. Rossi, supra note 3, at 401 (“[S]tate and local governments have taken a particularly
aggressive approach to addressing climate change, in many instances beating federal
regulators and Congress to the punch.”); see Klass & Wilson, supra note 4, at 1809 (“In the
absence of comprehensive federal policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and with few
federal policies to require renewable energy development, states have taken an active role in
developing their own policies to promote renewable energy.”); Vivian E. Thomson & Vicki
Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: Climate Change Policymaking and the
States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2011).
66. Renewable power standards require that a certain percentage of electricity generation
come from sources that are designated “renewable,” such as solar power and wind power.
Roger Martella et al., North American and Global Integration of Carbon Control Markets, in
2 THE LAW OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN CANADA 19-7 (Dennis Mahony ed., 2d ed. 2012). Over
half of the states now have these standards. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy:
Most States Have Renewable Portfolio Standards, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014) (stating that “30 States and
the District of Columbia had enforceable RPS or other mandated renewable capacity
policies, as of January 2012”).
67. California as well as a group of East Coast states have adopted cap-and-trade
systems to control greenhouse gas emissions. Coleman, supra note 4, at 115 n.115, 125–26.
In cap-and-trade systems, polluters must have a permit for each ton of pollution that they
emit, and they can purchase these permits from other companies or from the government, but
the government limits the number of permits, placing an overall cap on emissions. Id. at 91
& nn.8–9.
68. Ten states have decoupled utility compensation from energy consumption with the
intent of encouraging energy conservation. NAT’L ASS’N OF REG. UTILS. COMM’RS,
DECOUPLING FOR ELECTRIC & GAS UTILITIES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (2007),
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/supp_mat_decoupling_elec_gas_utilitie
s.pdf. Traditionally, price-regulated electric and natural-gas utilities are paid per unit of
energy that they deliver, which means utilities benefit if they can encourage their customers
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energy subsidies,70 and low-carbon fuel standards.71 State regulation of
energy has never been more important.72
But state regulation is being forced to adapt to rapidly integrating
national markets in energy commodities like fuel and electricity. As energy
markets have grown too large for a single state to encompass, state
regulators have responded by asserting broader authority, regulating in-state
transactions with the aim of influencing extraction and consumption of fuel
in other states, and thus exporting their energy policy to other states.
A. Restrictions on Electricity Import
The most prominent targets of exported state regulations are the sources
of imported electricity. As noted, if states simply ignored the sources of the
electricity that they import, imported energy could make their innovative
energy policies futile as a response to climate change. Thus, states are
addressing out-of-state power sources through cap-and-trade systems,
renewable portfolio standards, and coal-power moratoriums.
California recently adopted a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas
emissions.73 Under this system, California utilities must purchase a permit
for each ton of greenhouse gases that they emit when they produce
to use energy extravagantly. Id. at 2–3. Decoupling removes this incentive by adjusting
payments to utilities so that they do not directly depend on energy use. Id.
69. In 2007 the state of Minnesota placed a moratorium on construction of coal-fired
power plants. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subdiv. 3(2) (2011).
70. Nearly every state has some kind of financial incentive for renewable energy,
whether implemented through grants, loans, or personal or corporate taxes. S. GOUCHOE ET
AL., CASE STUDIES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGY 7–16 (2002), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy02osti/32819.pdf.
71. California Low Carbon Fuel Standard, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490
(2012). A low carbon fuel standard, unlike most fuel standards, does not merely regulate
emissions from burning fuel. Instead, it regulates all greenhouse gas emissions associated
with fuel production, including emissions in extracting and refining the fuel as well as other
emissions indirectly caused by fuel production. Thus, California’s low carbon fuel standard
regulates the “life-cycle emissions” of fuel used in California, which means:
[T]he aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions (including direct emissions
and significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions from land use
changes), as determined by the Executive Officer, related to the full fuel lifecycle,
including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and distribution, from
feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and delivery and use of
the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all
greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global warming
potential.
Id. § 95480.1(a)(38); see also id. §§ 95480–95490.
72. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1097 (2009) (arguing for states’ potential for innovative climate change regulation);
Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971, 978–81
(2013) (arguing in favor of fracking and suggesting that states should be the locus of
fracking regulation because of states’ potential for innovative regulation); see also Uma
Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 1679, 1693 (2012) (noting that most policy progress on renewable energy has been
limited to the “the state and local level”).
73. California Cap On Greenhouse Gas Emissions And Market-Based Compliance
Mechanisms, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95800–96023 (2012).
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electricity.74 But California imports electricity from other states in the
Southwest and Pacific Northwest.75 If California ignored the greenhouse
gases produced in these other states, imported electricity would have a
significant advantage over California electricity—it would be cheaper
because out-of-state producers would not need to purchase permits for their
greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, California’s cap-and-trade system
would be undercut—greenhouse gas emissions would shift to other states as
industrial consumers switched to cheaper electricity and out-of-state power
plants ramped up production.76 These out-of-state greenhouse gas
emissions would be just as bad for California as in-state emissions because
the effects of global warming do not depend on where the emissions
occur.77 And net greenhouse gas emissions might actually increase as
power production shifted to states that do not limit emissions.78 Even
worse, these states would become an increasingly powerful interest group
against state or federal climate legislation that could undercut their
competitive advantage by subjecting their emissions to comparable
controls.79 As a result, California has decreed that it will regulate out-ofstate greenhouse gas emissions in the same manner as in-state emissions:
electricity importers must purchase permits for emissions associated with
their electricity no matter where those emissions occur.80
74. Id. § 95800(b)(1) (defining “covered entities to include ‘First Deliverers of
Electricity’” including “Electricity generating facilities: the operator of an electricity
generating facility located in California”).
75. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California’s Major Sources of Energy, CA.GOV (2011),
http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/overview/energy_sources.html (California imports 21 percent
of its electricity from southwestern states like Arizona and Nevada and 8 percent from
Pacific Northwest states like Oregon).
76. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
77. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 10–11.
78. Cf. Glen P. Peters et al., Growth in Emission Transfers via International Trade from
1990 to 2008, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8903, 8904 (2011) (finding that greenhouse gas
emissions leaked from E.U. countries to developed nations outweigh all reductions
contemplated for the European Union under the Kyoto Protocol); see also Jonathan Baert
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE
L.J. 677, 695 (1999) (noting that estimates of likely leakage from the E.U. range “from 4%
to more than 100% of the emissions abatement achieved initially”).
79. See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and
National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 286–87 (2010);
Wiener, supra note 78, at 696 (describing this dynamic); see also Coleman, supra note 4, at
25 (“If leakage is sufficiently large, unilateral regulation may be worse than nothing; it will
increase emissions in other countries and harden resistance to greenhouse gas limits in the
very countries where they are increasingly emitted.”).
80. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95800(b)(1) (2012) (defining “covered entities” to
include “electricity importers”). Electricity importers are responsible for submitting permits
to cover all of their out-of-state emissions. Id. § 95852(b) (requiring permits for all emissions
“from a source in California or in a jurisdiction where a GHG emissions trading system has
not been approved for linkage;” to date, no neighboring jurisdiction has been approved for
linkage). California has also faced difficulty accounting for the “source” of electricity
imports because electricity is drawn from an undifferentiated pool. It may be attributed to a
single source as a matter of accounting, but it is, in fact, derived from all generation
connected to the grid. See James Coleman, Federal Court Strikes Down Minnesota’s Limits
on Coal Power Imports: A Critical Moment for State Regulation of Imported Fuel &
Electricity, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Apr. 24, 2014), http://theenergycollective.com/
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Minnesota faced a similar dilemma in 2007, when it placed a moratorium
on construction of coal-fired power plants as part of climate legislation.81
To ensure that this did not simply push new coal generation outside the
state borders, the state banned import of electricity produced by new coalfired power plants.82 This restriction on electricity from new out-of-state
coal power plants is not based on any characteristic of the electricity that is
imported—the electricity itself is the same whether the electricity comes
from an old coal plant, a new coal plant, a natural gas plant, or any other
energylawprof/371881/federal-court-strikes-down-minnesota-s-limits-coal-power-importscritical-momen (explaining that “the interstate electric grid” is “a pool of power” making it
impossible to trace the source of electricity). Thus, California utilities are increasingly
trading contracts that purport to come “from” coal plants to contracts that purport to come
from low-carbon sources. Danny Cullenward, How California’s Carbon Market Actually
Works, BULL. ATOM. SCI. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/08/09/
0096340214546834. Notably, another cap-and-trade system, the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, a cap-and-trade scheme designed by ten eastern states to stabilize and then slightly
lower greenhouse gas emissions, does not apply to imported electricity. Coleman, supra note
4, at 58. This cap, however, has been very lax, limiting the danger of emissions leakage.
JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41836, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE:
LESSONS LEARNED AND ISSUES FOR POLICYMAKERS 8–9 (2013),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41836.pdf. The participating states, however, are now
lowering the cap; depending on the result of this change, they may end up considering ways
of preventing leakage in the future. Id.
81. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03 (2011). In 2011, Minnesota’s Governor vetoed repeal of
this moratorium. Eric Roper, Dayton Vetoes ‘Cheeseburger Bill,’ STAR TRIB. (May 27,
2011), http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/122757954.html. In the same year, the
Canadian province of Ontario went even further, phasing out existing coal-fired power
plants. Cessation of Coal Use—Atikokan, Lambton, Nanticoke and Thunder Bay Generating
Stations, O. Reg. 496/07 (Can.), http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/regs/english/elaws
_regs_070496_e.htm# (closing out coal-power plants by 2015).
82. MINN. STAT. § 216H.03, subdiv. 3(2) (providing that no person shall “import or
commit to import from outside the state power from a new large energy facility that would
contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions”). “Statewide power sector
carbon dioxide emissions” are defined to include both “emissions of carbon dioxide from the
generation of electricity within the state and all emissions of carbon dioxide from the
generation of electricity imported from outside the state.” Id. subdiv. 2. The ban however
contained an exception for electricity imports if the new out-of-state coal facility offset its
emissions by funding or committing to greenhouse gas reductions elsewhere to the
satisfaction of Minnesota’s Public Utilities Commission. Id. subdiv. 4; id. § 216H.03(n).
California adopted a similar policy that forbids electricity providers from entering into longterm contracts with new coal-fired power plants whether they are inside or outside the state.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(a), (b)(1), (d)(1) (2008) (“No load-serving entity or local
publicly owned electric utility may enter into a long-term financial commitment unless any
baseload generation supplied under the long-term financial commitment complies with the
greenhouse gases emission performance standard established by the commission” which
must be set at “a rate of emissions of greenhouse gases that is no higher than the rate of
emissions of greenhouse gases for combined-cycle natural gas baseload generation.”).
Maine and Washington also passed coal-fired moratoriums, but these only applied to new instate sources. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 585-K(3) (2009) (“Between the effective date
of this subsection and the earlier of the effective date of rules authorized pursuant to
subsection 2 and August 1, 2011, the department may not issue any license or permit to a
coal gasification facility that is not licensed under this chapter prior to August 1, 2008.”);
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Performance Standards, WASH. REV. CODE § 80.80.040(3)(b)
(2011) (“All baseload electric generation that commences operation after June 30, 2008, and
is located in Washington, must comply with the greenhouse gases emissions performance
standard established in subsection (1) of this section.”).
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type of power source.83 Instead, the restriction addresses out-of-state
emissions.84
Perhaps the most common type of exported energy regulation is
accomplished through renewable portfolio standards—thirty-nine states
now employ these standards.85 Renewable power standards require utilities
to purchase a specified percentage of electricity generation from sources
that are designated “renewable,” such as solar power and wind power.86
Crucially, these standards do not require that in-state electricity producers
generate a specified percentage of energy from renewable sources. Instead,
they require that electricity providers purchase a specified percentage of
energy from renewable sources, which extends the renewable requirement
to all sources that sell to the regulating state, even if they are located outside
of the state.87 Of course, states could alter these standards so that they only
apply to in-state power production, but so far they have not taken that
route.88

83. Electricity is drawn from a national grid that pools power from numerous plants, so
the notion that electricity comes “from” a particular plant is an accounting convention rather
than a description of an observable physical phenomenon. See Samuel R. Brumberg, Getting
the Camel Out of the Tent: Behind the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Rise to
Power and the Importance of States’ Continued Regulatory Oversight, 30 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 691, 697–98 (2006) (comparing accounting for electricity sources
to a person in the United States paying a person in Spain for a cup of water with the water
added to the Atlantic Ocean on one side and withdrawn on the other); Steve Ferrey,
Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy
Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 602
(2004) (“As a matter of basic physics, an electron is an electron.”). Of course, different
power sources may produce different power profiles; for example, solar and wind energy do
not produce a constant amount of power since they depend on variable sunshine and wind.
The point, however, is that if a utility contracts to receive power with a given profile, it does
not matter how that electricity is generated as long as it meets the profile.
84. Although there are also moratoria on other types of plants such as nuclear, those
moratoria only apply to in-state construction. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State
Restrictions on New Nuclear Power Facility Construction, NESH.ORG (Dec. 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/states-restrictions-on-new-nuclear-powerfacility.aspx.
85. Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The Commerce
Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY
L. 59, 109–23 (2012); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce
Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295 (2013).
86. Klass & Wilson, supra note 4, at 1809; see also Patrick R. Jacobi, Note, Renewable
Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States Can Stop Worrying
and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT. L. REV. 1079, 1080–81, 1090
(2006).
87. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 196.378(2)(a)(2)(d) (2012) (“[F]or the year 2015, each
electric provider shall increase its renewable energy percentage so that it is at least 6
percentage points above the electric provider’s baseline renewable percentage.”); MD. CODE
ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-703(d) (West 2012) (“[A]n electricity supplier shall meet the
renewable energy portfolio standard by accumulating the equivalent amount of renewable
energy credits that equal the percentages required under this section.”).
88. They could also alter them to take better advantage of the market-participant
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, which allows states to favor in-state industry
when purchasing goods or services for their own use. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 103–05. See
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The states’ decision to regulate electricity based on its source, rather than
simply regulating in-state electricity production, places them in a bind
under the dormant Commerce Clause. A renewable power standard
operates by demanding compliance credits from utilities and providing
compliance credits to utilities that provide power from renewable sources.89
This leaves states with three choices. First, they can credit all out-of-state
electricity as renewable but, as described above, that will quickly
undermine the standard. Second, they can refuse to credit all out-of-state
electricity, but that would be discriminatory, violating the dormant
Commerce Clause.90 Third, they can apply their own renewable power
standard to out-of-state electricity, which also jeopardizes the regulation
under the dormant Commerce Clause.91 States have generally chosen a mix
of the second and third course, either refusing to credit out-of-state
electricity or applying their regulation to the sources of that electricity in
other states.92
B. Restrictions on Fuel Imports
States also have adopted regulations that control fuel production even if it
occurs in other states or countries. California, again, has been an earlier
experimenter with addressing out-of-state emissions. In 2010, California
adopted a “low carbon fuel standard.”93 The term is somewhat misleading:
these standards do not limit the amount of carbon that fuel may contain;
instead, they control the total amount of greenhouse gases that are emitted
as a result of production, transport, and finally combustion of the fuels that
are eventually retailed in California.94 That is, these standards attempt to
measure and control the greenhouse gases that are emitted when (1) oil is
extracted from the ground or when corn is grown for ethanol, (2) these
feedstocks are transported to refiners, (3) refiners turn these products into
fuel, (4) this fuel is transported to market, and (5) these fuels are burned in
motor vehicles.95 They also attempt to account for any greenhouse gases

generally Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 795 (1997) (describing scope of the exception).
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992); Dan Farber, Regulators
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Extraterritorial Dilemma, LEGAL PLANET (June 24,
2013), http://legal-planet.org/2013/06/24/regulators-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-theextraterritorial-dilemma.
91. See infra Part III.A; Farber, supra note 90.
92. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 109–23.
93. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079–80 (E.D.
Cal. 2011).
94. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (2012).
95. The standard regulates carbon intensity, which is defined as the “life-cycle
emissions” of fuel used in California, which means “the aggregate quantity of greenhouse
gas emissions (including direct emissions and significant indirect emissions such as
significant emissions from land use changes), as determined by the Executive Officer,
related to the full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and
distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and delivery
and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all
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emitted when (6) farmers around the world use more land for growing
biofuel feedstocks like corn rather than food or when (7) resulting food
shortages encourage others to shift undeveloped land into farms.96
California’s standard seeks to lower the sum total of all of these emissions,
which, in aggregate, is known as the “carbon intensity” of a fuel.97
Thus, carbon intensity is not an inherent quality of the finished product
that is sold in state—two chemically identical gallons of ethanol or gasoline
could have drastically different carbon intensities depending on how they
were produced and transported across the globe.98 Instead, California’s
low-carbon fuel standard is designed to address global fuel supply chains to
“reduc[e] the carbon intensity of transportation fuels used in California by
an average of 10 percent by the year 2020.”99 Other states are considering
following suit: Oregon and Washington are contemplating similar
standards,100 and there have been efforts to adopt these standards in the
group of eight northeast states known as the Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use Management.101
C. Restrictions on Fuel Exports
Energy exporters are also exporting regulation. As a combined result of
pollution regulations and the natural gas boom, many utilities are using
more natural gas and less coal, because gas has grown cheaper and
produces less pollution.102 But U.S. coal producers have found new
markets for their product: increasingly they are exporting coal to Asia and

greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global warming potential.” Id.
§§ 95480.1(a)(38); see also id. §§ 95480–95490.
96. Id. §§ 95480–95490.
97. Id.
98. CAL. AIR RES. BD., INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS V-30 (2009) (“[A] gallon of
ethanol made from corn grown and processed in the Midwest will, under a microscope or
other analytical device, look identical in every material way to a gallon of ethanol processed
from sugar cane grown in Brazil. Both samples of ethanol will have the same boiling point,
the same molecular composition, the same lower and upper limits of flammability—in other
words, both will have identical physical and chemical properties because both products
consist of 100% ethanol. On the other hand, the corn ethanol from the Midwest will have
different carbon intensity than the sugar cane ethanol from Brazil.”).
99. Id. at ES-6 (describing Executive Order S-01-07).
100. Scott Learn, Oregon’s Low-Carbon Fuel Standard Faces Legislative, Legal Hurdles,
OREGONIAN (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2012/04
/oregons_low-carbon_fuel_standa.html; STATE OF WASH. DEP’T OF ECOL., A LOW CARBON
FUEL STANDARD IN WASHINGTON:
INFORMING THE DECISION
(2011),
www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/docs/fuelstandards_finalreport_02182011.pdf.
101. NE. STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE MGMT., FINAL RESULTS: ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE NORTHEAST/MID-ATLANTIC (NE/MA) CLEAN FUELS STANDARD (Sept.
2011), http://www.nescaum.org/documents/cfs-econ-for-stakeholder-mtgs-sep-2011.pdf/. At
one time a low-carbon fuel standard was also considered by the six states (and one Canadian
province) that joined the now-defunct Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord. See
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord, Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship
Summit, Nov. 15, 2007.
102. F. Pratson, Drew Haerer & Dalia Patiño-Echeverri, Fuel Prices, Emission Standards,
and Generation Costs for Coal Versus Natural Gas Power Plants, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH.
4926, 4926 (2013).
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Europe where high natural gas prices are encouraging coal power.103 These
exports present state energy regulators with a similarly perplexing problem:
if state anti-coal regulations merely result in coal being burned elsewhere,
they will not effectively address greenhouse gas emissions due to coal
burning.104 Those emissions will have the same climate impact regardless
of whether the coal is burned in the United States or across the globe in
European and Asian countries importing U.S. coal.105
As a result, state regulators have begun scrutinizing fuel exports as well.
Proposals for new coal export facilities in the Pacific Northwest have been a
particular flashpoint for conflicts regarding the effect of coal exports. Two
large coal export facilities are being planned to receive coal by rail from the
Powder River Basin in Wyoming and Montana so that it can be shipped to
Asia: the Millennium Bulk Logistics Longview Terminal in Longview,
Washington and the Gateway Pacific Terminal at Cherry Point near
Ferndale, Washington.106 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is
responsible for considering the environmental impact of these facilities, and
ultimately approving their construction, has said that its analysis will not
consider the “burning of coal overseas” because those events are “outside
the Corps’ control and responsibility.”107 The State of Washington, on the
other hand, has declared that its analysis of the Longview Terminal will
consider greenhouse gas emissions from “end-use coal combustion”
because those emissions “contribute to climate change which in turn can

103. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Today in Energy: Multiple Factors Push Western Europe
to Use Less Natural Gas and More Coal, EIA.GOV (Sept. 27, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13151; Thomas K. Grose, As U.S. Cleans
Its Energy Mix, It Ships Coal Problems Abroad, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2013/03/130315-us-coal-exports.
104. Thus they may entirely fail to serve their purpose in combating global environmental
problems like climate change. In contrast, local pollutants will decrease if the coal is burned
elsewhere, but even that may be problematic to the extent that a local regulator is concerned
about local pollution in other parts of the globe. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
105. Even conventional pollutants such as particulate matter are increasingly reaching the
United States from their sources across the Pacific Ocean. M. Huang et al., Impacts of
Transported Background Pollutants on Summertime Western US Air Quality: Model
Evaluation, Sensitivity Analysis and Data Assimilation, 13 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY &
PHYSICS 359 (2013).
106. U.S. Energy Abundance: Regulatory, Market and Legal Barriers to Export:
Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 133 Cong. (2013) (statement of Jennifer
A. Moyer, Acting Chief, Regulatory Program, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs) [hereinafter U.S.
Energy Abundance]. At one point there were also plans for exports from new facilities in
Grays Harbor, Washington, and Coos Bay and St. Helens Bay, Oregon, but these plans have
now been shelved. Associated Press, Company Shelves Hoquian Coal-Export Flow, SEATTLE
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2018917971
_coalexport15.html; Scott Learn, Port of Coos Bay Coal-Export Proposal Ends After 18
Months of Work, OREGONIAN (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com
/environment/index.ssf/2013/04/port_of_coos_bay_coal-export_p.html; Kim Murphy, Plans
Shelved for Coal Export Terminal in Oregon, LA TIMES (May 8, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/08/nation/la-na-nn-coal-export-oregon-20130508.
107. U.S. Energy Abundance, supra note 106, at 5.
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affect snow pack levels, ocean acidification and wildfire season in
Washington.”108
The same issues have arisen in consideration of liquefied natural gas
exports from northwestern states. Again, the federal government has shown
little interest in considering the impact of burning natural gas overseas (or
assessing emissions due to increased extraction of natural gas).109 FERC
has exclusive authority to approve or deny siting, construction, and
Nevertheless, state
operation of liquefied natural gas facilities.110
governments have pushed for a larger role in federal approvals.111
Environmental groups have urged federal and state regulators to leverage
these permitting decisions to assess the combustion of exported natural gas
in the overseas destinations that these facilities will serve.112
The oil trade also has faced increased challenges from environmental
groups concerned about the consequences of oil extraction in North
America and oil consumption in U.S. trading partners. In November 2013,
an ordinance nearly passed in South Portland, Maine that would have
banned any increased oil storage or transport because there were rumors
that a pipeline leading from Montreal to South Portland would soon be
carrying heavy crude from Canada for export overseas.113 A month after
108. Millennium Bulk Terminals-Longview Environmental Impact Statements,
Frequently Asked Questions, State Environmental Policy Act Environmental Impact
Statement,
http://www.millenniumbulkeiswa.gov/frequently-asked-questions.html.
Washington, however, warns: “The analysis does NOT include evaluating environmental
impacts within any country importing the coal.” Id.
109. See, e.g., FERC, SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION PROJECT MODIFICATION,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 66–67 (Apr. 2013); FERC, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR
THE
SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION PROJECT 2-99 to 2-100 (Dec. 2011),
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EA-1845-FEA-2011.pdf.
FERC’s
most
recent
environmental assessment, covering the Cove Bay LNG facility in Oregon also declined to
perform a detailed study of the impact of LNG exports on global greenhouse gas emissions.
FERC, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE COVE POINT LIQUEFACTION PROJECT 173–75
(May 2014), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/enviro/eis/2014/05-15-14-ea/ea.pdf. It did,
however, highlight the environmental benefits that foreign countries would receive from
burning natural gas instead of coal or oil. Id. at 175. The Department of Energy also put out
a policy paper on the general impact of LNG, which emphasized its potential climate
benefits by comparing natural gas to coal rather than to alternative energy sources such as
nuclear, hydropower, or wind power. TIMOTHY J. SKONE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LIFE
CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS PERSPECTIVE ON EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM THE
UNITED STATES (2014), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/05/f16/Life%20Cycle%
20GHG%20Perspective%20Report.pdf.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005)) (“The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to
approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an
LNG terminal.”).
111. See Motion to Intervene by the Oregon Department of Energy, LNG Development
Co. v. Oregon Pipeline Co., L.L.C., Nos. CP09-6, CP09-6-001 (FERC July 11, 2013).
112. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Petition to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, State
of Oregon, and State of Washington, http://action.sierraclub.org/site/PageNavigator/LNG_
Petition.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
113. See Waterfront Protection Ordinance (2013), http://www.southportland.org/
files/6713/7666/1956/1g_Actual_WPO_from_the_Citizens_Petition.pdf; Whit Richardson,
South Portland Narrowly Rejects Attempt to Ban ‘Tar Sands Oil’ from Waterfront, BANGOR
DAILY
NEWS
(Nov.
5,
2013),
http://bangordailynews.com/2013/11/05
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the ordinance was rejected, the city council placed a moratorium on exports
of oil sands crude.114 And the Pacific Northwest has seen controversies
about proposed oil exports as well. A lease for a major terminal capable of
transferring 360,000 barrels of oil per day from rail to ships and barges was
approved in the Port of Vancouver, Washington over the objection of
environmental groups.115 Three other terminals proposed for Gray’s
Harbor, Washington received development permits from local authorities,
but these permits were overturned by the Washington Shorelines Hearings
Board, which ruled that the authorities had failed to consider the combined
impact of all three terminals.116 The Port of Vancouver lease also has been
challenged in court by environmental groups claiming that crude oil
exported from the facility will exacerbate climate change when it is
burned.117
D. Restrictions on Cross-State Shipments of Energy Goods and Equipment
Given increasing efforts to address fossil fuel extraction and combustion
indirectly through scrutiny of imports and exports, it may not be surprising
that regulators and activists are looking further up and down supply chains
to find more chokepoints that could slow the fossil fuel industry. As a
result, transstate shipments of fossil fuels and even fossil fuel extraction
equipment have faced increased scrutiny in states across the country. This
increased scrutiny for fossil fuel transport has been accompanied by efforts
to encourage states to support transmission of renewable power to support
renewable industries in other states.
Minnesota legislators, working with the climate action group MN350,
recently proposed a bill that would place a fee on every gallon of oil that
moved through the state either by rail or pipeline.118 The stated purpose of
the bill is to fund emergency preparedness for crude-by-rail accidents, but
the fee would apply to any mode of transportation, and MN350 has been
clear that its ultimate goal is to shut down development of the oil sands in

/politics/preliminary-vote-totals-show-south-portland-rejecting-attempt-to-ban-tar-sands-oilfrom-waterfront. The moratorium has since been transformed into a permanent ban. Kelley
Bouchard, South Portland Approves Law Barring Tar Sands Oil, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD
(July 22, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/07/22/south-portland-set-for-final-voteon-tar-sands-ban.
114. Whit Richardson, South Portland Council Approves Moratorium on Tar Sands,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/12/17/politics
/south-portland-council-passes-tar-sands-moratorium.
115. Scott Learn, Port of Vancouver Approves Big Crude Oil Terminal Amid Safety
Concerns, OREGONIAN (July 25, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/environment
/index.ssf/2013/07/port_of_vancouver_approves_big.html.
116. Quinault Indian Nation v. City of Hoquiam, No. 13-012c, 2013 WL 6062377 (Wash.
Shore Hearing Bd. Dec. 9, 2013) (order on summary judgment).
117. Complaint, Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver (Clark Cnty. Ct. Oct. 2,
2013), available at http://columbiariverkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ComplaintRiverkeeper-v-Port-of-Vanc.pdf.
118. David Shaffer, Minnesota Legislators Push for Better Oil-Transport Disaster
Response, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.startribune.com/business
/245279801.html.
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Canada.119 This effort builds upon a long history of attacking transport of
fossil fuels to slow extraction and combustion of coal, oil, and gas.120 In
the summer of 2013, Sierra Club and several other environmental
organizations supplemented their legal attack on coal export facilities with a
lawsuit against the railroad carrying coal through eastern Washington.121
The suit alleged that coal dust from the trains was polluting federal waters
in violation of the Clean Water Act.122 Environmental groups are looking
to push even further up supply chains, suing to prevent shipments of
equipment to the oil industry—known as “megaloads”—that travel on U.S.
highways on their way to the oil sands in Canada.123
Interstate electricity markets are also forcing state regulators to consider
the impact of their decisions on emissions in other states. Public utility
commissions that must approve transmission lines now routinely consider
the impact of transmission on electricity production in other states.124 For
example, a transmission line from in-state windmills to out-of-state
consumers could also provide those consumers with cleaner air if it
displaced local coal power.125 FERC now requires states to consider the
energy policies of other states in their transmission siting decisions.126
III. THE CASE FOR LIMITED FEDERAL AUTHORIZATION
AND PREEMPTION OF STATE EXPORTED REGULATIONS
State exported regulations are an understandable outgrowth of state
leadership in energy regulation overlaid upon increasingly integrated energy
119. Grace Kelly, Danger of Oil Spills in Minnesota, MINN. PROGRESSIVE PROJECT (July
16, 2013), http://mnprogressiveproject.com/30605 (arguing that pipelines should be rejected
because “Canadian oil sands crudes” carried by them are “more greenhouse gas intensive”
than average and it was “told by climate scientists that full development of tar sands oil will
mean ‘Game Over’ for the climate”).
120. See, e.g., Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520 (8th
Cir. 2003) (holding environmental impact statement on new rail line inadequate for failure to
consider the increased use of coal that the line would enable).
121. Sierra Club v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 1:13-cv-00272-LRS, 2014 WL 53309 (E.D.
Wash. Jan. 2, 2014).
122. Id.
123. Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 3:13-CV-348-BLW, 2013 WL 5592765
(D. Idaho Oct. 10, 2013). On the flip side, they have also pushed further downstream to
regulate petroleum coke storage, which is a byproduct of refining oil sands crude. Tina
Sfondeles, Rahm Emanuel to Propose Ordinance Prohibiting New Petcoke Facilities, CHI.
SUN TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014, 6:44 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/news/metro/25532779418/rahm-emanuel-to-propose-ordinance-prohibiting-new-petcoke-facilities.html.
124. Conversely, states making decisions about siting power generation facilities must
consider likely transmission decisions in other states. See Outka, supra note 72, at 1692 n.45;
Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 245–46 (2012)
(exploring disparity between electricity generation siting which nominally remains in state
control and siting regimes governing electricity and natural gas transmission); see also Tara
Benedetti, Running Roughshod? Extending Federal Siting Authority Over Interstate Electric
Transmission Lines, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 253 (2010) (“While states have historically
controlled the siting of interstate electric transmission lines, many federal legislators and
regulators believe stronger federal authority over siting is necessary.”).
125. Stein, supra note 124, at 247–48.
126. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. 35).
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markets. But they are inconsistent with conventional dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and present serious challenges for integrated national
energy markets. As a result, state regulations have been bogged down in
dormant Commerce Clause challenges around the country. The regulations
present practical problems as well: they present opportunities for state
protectionism, threaten to undermine the federal government’s push for
integrated national energy markets, and present courts with technical
questions that are difficult to resolve under traditional modes of review. To
preserve both the benefit of state leadership in energy and climate policy
and the achievement of integrated national energy markets, the federal
government should authorize a limited subset of state exported regulations.
Specifically, Congress should empower FERC to authorize state exported
regulations so long as they do not discriminate against the out-of-state
energy industry or splinter interstate energy markets.
A. Problem One: Dormant Commerce Clause Litigation
Many of the flagship state energy policies have been cast into doubt by
lawsuits alleging violations of the dormant Commerce Clause. Minnesota’s
coal-power phaseout was challenged by North Dakota and was struck down
by a Minnesota federal district court.127 California’s low-carbon fuel
standard was first struck down by a federal district court in California,128
then reinstated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.129 Complaints have
also been filed against renewable power standards in Colorado, Delaware,
Missouri, and Ohio.130 And neither the case law nor legal scholarship
provides a strong basis for defending these lawsuits under current dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.

127. North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 11-cv-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331, at
*21–22 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014) (holding that Minnesota’s import restriction necessarily
regulated out-of-state conduct, violating the dormant Commerce Clause, because electricity
on the grid “does not recognize state boundaries”).
128. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078–79 (E.D.
Cal. 2011), rev’d, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). In full disclosure, I represented some of
the plaintiffs in this case until August 2011 when I left private practice. I have had no
involvement in the case since that time.
129. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013). The
decision made no reference to the protectionist motives that California used to explain its
own regulation, see infra notes 175–83 and accompanying text, and explained its decision
with a separate section arguing that “California should be encouraged to continue and to
expand its efforts to find a workable solution to lower carbon emissions.” Corey, 730 F.3d at
1106–07. Seven circuit judges dissented from the denial of rehearing in the case. Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2014).
130. See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Early Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting
Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants’ Early Motion for Summary Judgment, Energy &
Envt. Legal Inst. v. Epel, No. 1:11-cv-00859-WJM-BNB (D. Colo. May 9, 2014) (dismissing
dormant commerce clause claims); Brief for Appellant, In re Application of Champaign
Wind L.L.C., No. 2013-1874 (Ohio Feb. 3, 2014); see also Nichols v. Markell, No. 12-777CJB, 2014 WL 1509780 (D. Del. Apr. 17, 2014) (allowing dormant Commerce Clause
claims to proceed); Missouri ex rel. Mo. Energy Dev. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 386
S.W.3d 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Ferrey, supra note 85, at 69, 106–07.
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The dormant Commerce Clause is the “negative implication” of
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 authority “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”131 It disables states from regulating commerce in three ways.
First, states may not impose burdens on interstate commerce that are
“clearly excessive” in comparison to their legitimate local benefits; this is a
balancing test known as the Pike test.132 Second, states may not
discriminate between in-state and out-of-state commercial interests.133
Third, states may not regulate with the aim “to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the State.”134 The Pike test does not present an existential
threat to state energy regulation: so long as states do not discriminate or
regulate out-of-state activity, courts will afford their calculation of benefits
and burdens wide latitude.135 The other two prohibitions—forbidding
discrimination and extraterritoriality—are far more problematic.
The discrimination test will have a significant impact on state energy
regulation. In pursuit of “green jobs” twenty-three of the nation’s thirtynine state renewable power standards discriminate between in-state energy
and out-of-state energy.136 These discriminatory standards are unlikely to
survive dormant Commerce Clause review.137 Although lawsuits against
131. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
132. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”).
133. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988) (“This ‘negative’
aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors.”).
134. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). Under this doctrine, “the
Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes
place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within
the State.” (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982)); see also C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (“States and localities may
not attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to control commerce in other States.”).
135. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 347 (2007) (describing Pike test as “permissive” and rejecting “invitations to rigorously
scrutinize economic legislation passed under the auspices of the police power”). The
Supreme Court has not struck down a state regulation under the Pike test since 1982.
Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 417, 456 & n.220 (2008) (citing David S. Day, The ‘Mature’ Rehnquist Court
and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D.
L. REV. 1, 49 (2007)).
136. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 72 n.115. This discrimination may have been inspired by
national renewable standards across the globe that generally take this form and are now, in
turn, the subject of international trade law disputes. Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next
Generation of Trade and Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108
NW. U. L. REV. 401, 452 (2014).
137. Nathan E. Endrud, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity
and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and
Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 265 (2008); Ferrey, supra note 85,
at 69, 106–07; Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to
Accommodate New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 1004–05 (2009)
(describing Commerce Clause issues when “states promote renewable resources in state to
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these standards have not yet been decided, in a recent FERC case, Judge
Posner described the dormant Commerce Clause as “an insurmountable
constitutional objection” to Michigan’s discriminatory state standard.138
Ultimately, however, the prohibition on discrimination will not vitiate
state energy regulation: states simply must modify their regulations to treat
in-state and out-of-state power on an evenhanded basis.139 There is no
environmental necessity to favor in-state power; indeed many states already
employ nondiscriminatory power standards.140 Furthermore, apart from
renewable power standards, many of the other state regulations are, at least
on their face, nondiscriminatory. For example, Minnesota’s coal-power
phaseout seems to apply the same standard for in-state and out-of-state
electricity: no electricity from new coal-fired power plants.141
The prohibition on extraterritorial regulation, however, is a mortal threat
to nearly all exported energy regulation. It forbids regulation with “the
practical effect” of “control[ling] conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State.”142 That forbidden effect is the aim of exported state energy
regulation. State regulation of imported fuel and electricity is designed to
limit greenhouse gas emissions associated with producing that fuel and
electricity out of state.143 A low-carbon fuel standard is designed to limit
greenhouse gas emissions from production of fuels all over the world.144 A
state cap-and-trade or renewable power standard is designed to limit
greenhouse gas emissions from power plants in all of its electricity trading
partners.145
Although dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is famously murky
and unsettled,146 the Court has made clear that a state may not “project its
the exclusion of power produced out of state”); Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 ENVTL. ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 34 (2009).
138. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).
139. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 106 (“The state . . . must not discriminate based solely on
geography.”).
140. Id. (“[S]ome RPS states facially discriminate based on geography, others de facto
discriminate based on geography, and others do not discriminate.”).
141. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
142. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); see also Nat’l Solid Wastes
Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1999) (“No state has the authority to
tell other polities what laws they must enact or how affairs must be conducted outside its
borders.”); id. at 1154 (“Wisconsin’s legislative power is limited to what happens in
Wisconsin.”); Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 658–60 (7th Cir.
1995) (stating that “a long line of cases . . . make clear that the Court will not hesitate to
strike down a state law shown to have extraterritorial scope and an adverse impact on
commerce occurring wholly outside the enacting state” and this “prohibition against direct
regulation of interstate commerce by the states has been applied consistently by the
circuits”).
143. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Part II.B.
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10 (2003) (dormant
Commerce Clause “pervasively viewed as ‘incoherent’ and ‘hopelessly confused’”); see also
Kristin E. Hickman & Sarah L. Bunce, Foreword: DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno and the
Constitutionality of State Tax Incentives for Economic Development, 4 GEO. J. L. & PUB.
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The “Commerce
legislation” into a neighboring state.147
Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that
takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the State.”148 Although there is an active
debate on the current scope of the extraterritoriality doctrine,149 even its
critics and those who believe it is largely “dead”150 admit that it continues
to forbid any regulation that is designed to “project[]” state regulation into
another state or “control” activity in another state.151
In fact, modern extraterritoriality doctrine flows from a case that closely
parallels exported state energy regulation. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc.,152 the U.S. Supreme Court heard a challenge to a New York statute
that set the minimum price at which milk could be purchased from dairies.
To ensure that cheaper Vermont dairies did not undercut New York’s
mandated dairy price, New York also dictated that milk could not be
retailed within the state unless it had been purchased from a dairy at the
New York price.153 Justice Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, struck
down the regulation, holding that New York had no power “to suppress or
mitigate the consequences of competition between the states.”154 He
acknowledged that the Court’s decision would undercut New York’s efforts
to provide more protection than Vermont for the well being of its dairies.155
The price paid for the Constitution was that “the several states must sink or
swim together” because “in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division.”156 If a state “may guard [its industry] against
competition with [other states], the door has been opened to rivalries and
POL’Y 15, 21 (2006) (“The Court has acknowledged that its case-by-case approach toward
policing the boundary between the Commerce Clause and state tax policy has resulted in
‘much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the
States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.’” (quoting Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984))).
147. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935). Baldwin is “sometimes
called the father of the modern extraterritoriality doctrine.” Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder,
700 F.3d 796, 815 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., concurring).
148. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982).
149. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127 (2014).
150. Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 980 (2013).
151. Id. at 992 (noting courts strike down laws “where it is clear that a statute seeks to
enable State A to control activities occurring in State B, or to use Baldwin’s phrase, where
State A is ‘projecting’ its legislation into State B”); see also Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at
815 (criticizing the extraterritoriality doctrine but reaffirming the importance of Baldwin’s
rejection of “duties designed to neutralize advantages . . . [of] place of origin” (quoting
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527)); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335–36 (1989) (noting “the
Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union
unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the
individual States within their respective spheres”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The
Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785 (2001).
152. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
153. Id. at 519.
154. Id. at 522.
155. Id. at 522–23.
156. Id. at 523.
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reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the
states to the power of the nation.”157
Justice Cardozo also stressed that New York could restrict the sale of
milk if something was wrong with the milk itself,158 but could not
“neutralize advantages” created by Vermont’s lack of pricing regulation.159
After all, he noted, if New York could set the minimum price for milk, “the
next step would be to condition importation upon proof of a satisfactory
wage scale in factory or shop”160—i.e., states could also demand that
retailers only sell goods that had been produced by workers earning a
minimum wage. States and cities with protective labor and employment
standards naturally feel aggrieved when their prices are undercut by imports
from parts of the country without these standards. Barring trade
agreements, nations may close their borders to goods from other nations
with poor labor or environmental standards. But if every state and locality
could prohibit the purchase of goods from anywhere else that did not meet
its labor standards that “would be to invite a speedy end of our national
solidarity.”161
New York’s milk regulation closely parallels California’s low-carbon
fuel standard and Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act.162 As in
Baldwin the regulated product is a commodity: milk is the same whatever
the price paid to the dairy, just as electricity sold in Minnesota is no
different whether it came from a coal-fired plant in North Dakota or from
wind generation,163 and just as gasoline sold in California is no different
whether it came from the oil sands in Canada or a tight oil play in Texas.164
Just as in Baldwin, the justification for regulation is competitive: if
Minnesota and California only imposed the burden of regulation on in-state
greenhouse gas emissions, their oil and electricity industries would be
undercut by out-of-state producers.165
157. Id. at 522.
158. Id. at 524.
159. Id. at 527.
160. Id. at 524.
161. Id. at 523. The Court’s strongest statement of this principle appeared in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore:
We may assume, arguendo, that it would be wise for every State to adopt Dr.
Gore’s preferred rule . . . But while we do not doubt that Congress has ample
authority to enact such a policy for the entire Nation, it is clear that no single State
could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on neighboring States.
517 U.S. 559, 570–71 (1996).
162. Minnesota Next Generation Energy Act, MINN. STAT. § 216H.03 (2011), invalidated
by North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 11-CV-3232 SRN/SER, 2014 WL 1612331 (D. Minn.
Apr. 18, 2014).
163. See Brumberg, supra note 83, at 697–98.
164. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 98, at V-30.
165. See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. Alternatively, California has
sometimes argued that it has “assumed legal and political responsibility for emissions of
carbon resulting from the production and transport, regardless of location, of transportation
fuels actually used in California.” Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F.
Supp. 2d 1071, 1091–92 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasis added). This of course, makes matters
worse, as it amounts to an admission that it has violated Baldwin’s prohibition on
“project[ing]” state regulation into other states. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521; see also C & A
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It does not help states to argue that the ultimate transaction they are
regulating—a sale of fuel or electricity—takes place within their
jurisdiction. By necessity, states only regulate transactions within their
borders; the point of the prohibition on extraterritorial regulation is that
states cannot leverage in-state regulation to control actions elsewhere. Just
as New York restricted retail of milk within the state based on the price that
was paid for it out of state, states are regulating in-state electricity and fuel
sales based on the greenhouse gas emissions used to produce them out of
state. Simply put, exported energy regulations violate the Court’s
consistent command that “[s]tates and localities may not attach restrictions
to exports or imports in order to control commerce in other [s]tates.”166
State cap-and-trade and renewable power standards likely meet the same
fate under conventional dormant Commerce Clause analysis. If they only
applied to in-state emissions, they would avoid dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny. But they apply to emissions in the supply chain of electricity,
even though electricity, like milk, is the same regardless of how it was
produced. Of course, like Minnesota and California’s statutes, it is quite
possible that some of these statutes may ultimately survive legal challenges.
Some may be upheld in court,167 some may never be challenged, and
industry may choose to settle some challenges while leaving most of the
programs intact, as it did in lawsuits against renewable power standards in
Massachusetts and New York.168 Nevertheless, under conventional
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine these exported regulations will remain
in legal jeopardy.169
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (finding that states may not
“extend [their] police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds”).
166. C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
167. Indeed, the low-carbon fuel standard was ultimately upheld by the Ninth Circuit over
the dissent of seven judges. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507 (9th
Cir. 2014); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). The
judges in that case decided that the Supreme Court’s extraterritoriality cases only forbid
extraterritorial price regulation, not extraterritorial regulation of how items are produced in
other states. Under this reasoning, California could forbid the importation of any goods
produced in a way that it did not favor. California has already leapt at the opportunity:
forbidding the importation of eggs that came from chickens that were not treated up to
California’s standards. Complaint, Missouri ex. rel. Chris Koster v. Harris, No. 1:14-AT00067 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2014). Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning California could, of
course, also forbid imports from any state or country that did not follow California’s
environmental standards or labor standards.
168. Complaint at 1, Transcanada Power Mktg., Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 40070-FDS (C.D.
Mass. 2010); Partial Settlement Agreement at 1, Transcanada Power Mktg., No. 40070FDS,
available
at
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/settlementagreement.pdf.
169. A further possibility is that the courts could abandon the long-standing
extraterritoriality doctrine. From a policy perspective, courts may believe it is more
important to “encourage[] [states] to continue and to expand [their] efforts to find a workable
solution to lower carbon emissions” than to insist on constitutional limits on intranational
trade barriers. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107. Climate regulation advocates could join forces with
conservative thinkers that have long expressed discomfort with the extraterritoriality
doctrine. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 344–45 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 810–15 (6th Cir.
2012) (Sutton, J., concurring); Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 151. These critics generally
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On the other hand, state regulation of fossil fuel exports and regulation of
cross-state energy and energy equipment transport fares better in a dormant
Commerce Clause analysis for two reasons. First, many of the state
regulations involved—denying permits for export and transport facilities—
would be difficult to challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause.170
Given the multitude of factors that go into state permitting decisions, it
would be difficult for a federal court to invalidate a state decision to reject
an export facility even if the decision rested, in part, on a consideration of
out-of-state emissions associated with the export’s supply chain.171
Second, even if export controls also are motivated by concern over
greenhouse gas emissions associated with fossil fuel use, laws like
argue that the dormant Commerce Clause should only be used to strike down discriminatory
state laws, so the extraterritoriality test is unnecessary and imprecise. Healy, 491 U.S. at
344–45; Am. Beverage Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 810–15; Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 151. It is
better to focus on discrimination, they say, because “innumerable valid state laws affect
pricing decisions in other States,” so how can courts strike down laws on the basis of their
extraterritorial effect? Healy, 491 U.S. at 345. Trade law, however, has long answered this
puzzle: regulations are extraterritorial and thus invalid only when, as in Baldwin, the
regulation is targeted at out-of-state decisions. There is a simple way to tell if a regulation is
aimed at out-of-state production: (1) does the regulation address a characteristic of the
product itself or (2) does it address how the product was made? Regulation of a product’s
characteristics often affects manufacturing and pricing decisions in other states and Justice
Scalia is correct that these incidental effects are acceptable. Id. But restricting imports of
products based on how they were made is the archetypal trade restriction. If the United
States banned the sale of products produced by workers who were not paid the U.S.
minimum wage, it would cut off most imports from the developing world. Similarly, if
California required that products sold within its borders be manufactured in compliance with
all of its labor and environmental standards, the practical result of this nondiscriminatory law
would be a complete ban on imports: labor and environmental standards differ from state to
state and nation to nation so only California products would qualify for sale in California.
Any coherent rule against trade restrictions must include an extraterritoriality rule as well as
an antidiscrimination rule. Thus, the new climate regulations expose a flaw in the
conservative critique of the extraterritoriality doctrine. For example, California pays a
higher minimum wage. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182.12 (West 2014) (setting minimum wage
at $9.00 per hour as of July 1, 2014). Imagine that California prohibited sale of any product
that was not manufactured by workers paid its minimum wage. Such a regulation would be
perfectly nondiscriminatory—it would apply equally to workers inside or outside California.
But it would be extraterritorial. For that reason, it would violate not only intranational trade
principles but also U.S. international trade agreements. Singapore Ministerial Declaration of
13 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996) (“We reject the use of labour standards for
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly
low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question.”). If the dormant
Commerce Clause prevents states from forbidding imports, it must include an
extraterritoriality prong.
170. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1258 (1986) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has been more forgiving of regulations of export than import).
171. But see Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1018
(S.D. 2002) (holding that siting regulation violated dormant Commerce Clause by imposing
administrative burdens that would prevent a pipeline from being built). Indeed, when
Oregon recently rejected a moderate-sized coal export facility it rested its decision on local
water quality impacts rather than the extraterritorial climate impacts that brought attention to
the planned facility. STATE OF OREGON, SUMMARY OF THE COYOTE ISLAND TERMINAL PERMIT
DECISION (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.oregon.gov/dsl/PERMITS/docs/cit_decision
_summary.pdf.
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Minnesota’s proposed oil shipment fees are, in part, aimed at local impacts
including the danger of crude oil spills.172 Minnesota has not, for instance,
proposed distinguishing among the types of crude transported through the
state based on their different out-of-state emissions.173 Although they
would likely survive judicial review, these mixed-motive regulations, like
state regulation of imported fuel and electricity present practical problems
for national energy markets, as explored in the next section.
B. Problem Two: Splintering Energy Markets
The problems with exported state energy regulation are not merely legal.
These regulations provide states with a strong temptation to engage in
protectionism, which in turn threatens to splinter national energy markets.
In Baldwin, Justice Cardozo warned that allowing one state to project its
regulation into another would mean “the door has been opened to rivalries
and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce
between the states to the power of the nation.”174 State exported
regulations have confirmed this prediction. The most obvious example is
state renewable power standards that explicitly favor in-state power. But
protectionism is ubiquitous in state exported energy regulations, taking both
blatant and subtle forms.
California’s low-carbon fuel standard demonstrates how even wellintentioned regulation presents a temptation toward protectionism. The
low-carbon fuel standard was authorized by Governor Schwarzenegger in
January 2007 as part of California’s efforts to cut its greenhouse gas
emissions back to 1990 levels by 2020.175 Scientists from the University of
California system set its initial design, which was supposed to incorporate
the most recent research on fuel lifecycles.176
During its implementation, the low-carbon fuel standard was quickly
altered based on more parochial concerns. For example, the standard was
supposed to strictly penalize the sale of fuel derived from unconventional
heavy oils because those oils require more energy to extract. Thus, it
implemented punishing carbon intensity scores for fuels from Canada and

172. On the other hand, it is possible that Minnesota’s law would be subject to a
preemption challenge under the Pipeline Safety Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 60104(c) (2012) (“A
State authority may not adopt or continue in force safety standards for interstate pipeline
facilities or interstate pipeline transportation.”).
173. Some outward focused energy transport regulations affirmatively enable interstate
commerce. For example, FERC has now authorized, indeed required, states to consider the
impact of their electric transmission siting decisions on other states’ renewable energy
industries. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and
Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842, 49,846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18
C.F.R. 35).
174. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
175. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (E.D.
Cal. 2011).
176. See generally ALEXANDER E. FARRELL & DANIEL SPERLING, A LOW-CARBON FUEL
STANDARD FOR CALIFORNIA PART 1:
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS (2007), available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6j67z9w6.

2014]

IMPORTING ENERGY, EXPORTING REGULATION

1387

Venezuela.177 But California could not bring itself to regulate its own oil so
strictly, so it exempted unconventional California oil despite its similar
emission profile.178 In tandem, these decisions meant that the standard
insulated California heavy oil from foreign competition. California also did
not rely on the U.S. government’s standard model, known as GREET, for
estimating emissions associated with producing ethanol.179 Instead, it
created an alternate California model, CA-GREET, that broke up ethanol
into two geographical categories, “California” and “Midwest.”180
California’s modified model consistently assigned “a higher [carbon
intensity] score to the ethanol produced in the Midwest and [a] lower score
to the ethanol produced the same way in California.”181
By the time that California’s regulation was finally adopted, the state was
explaining its protectionist impulses forthrightly, noting that “[o]ne of the
key advantages of the [standard] . . . is that it reduces our dependence on
foreign oil,” and would “reduc[e] the volume of transportation fuels that are
imported from other states.”182 As California explained: “Displacing
imported transportation fuels with biofuels produced in the State keeps
more money in the State.”183 From its original aim of reducing out-of-state
greenhouse gas emissions, a well-intentioned if constitutionally suspect
goal, the purpose of the standard gradually shifted to fuel industry
protectionism.
Given the detours taken by such well-intentioned regulations, it is not
surprising that state renewable power standards also have resulted in
protectionist battles. As one commentator noted, “[n]o renewable energy
mandate passed a state legislature without the promise of thousands of new
jobs,” so legislatures have insisted that the renewable power mandated by
the standards be developed within the state.184 For this reason, over half of
renewable power standards explicitly discriminate in favor of in-state
renewable energy.185 As a result, these renewable power standards are
177. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, No. CV-F-09-2234 LJO DLB, slip
op. at *17–21 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011) (order granting summary adjudication motion for
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n).
178. Id. After its regulation was enjoined by the district court, California introduced
regulatory amendments that calculate emissions for California’s heavy oil, but continue to
favor it by treating it as part of the same batch as light oil from California and other
jurisdictions. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: AMENDMENTS TO THE
LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD REGULATION (2012).
179. CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD., supra note 178, at 16.
180. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1086–87.
181. Id. at 1089. California justified its modification to the federal model by pointing
further up the supply chain, noting that Midwestern ethanol facilities rely on electricity from
power plants that, in turn, produce greater greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at 1088. The point,
however, is that it is simple to alter a model and the boundaries of a lifecycle analysis to
achieve a result that will favor in-state industry.
182. Id. at 1079–80.
183. CAL. AIR RES. BD., FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: CALIFORNIA’S LOW CARBON
FUEL STANDARD 479 (2009).
184. John Farrell, In-State Renewable Energy Development and the Commerce Clause,
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.ilsr.org/state-renewable-energydevelopment-and-commerce-clause.
185. Ferrey, supra note 85, at 72 n.115.
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working at cross-purposes with FERC efforts to integrate state electricity
markets.
State renewable power standards also incorporate more subtle
discrimination. For example, most of the New England states exclude
inexpensive Canadian hydropower from their renewable power standards
through limitations on the construction date and size of qualifying
Despite its low-carbon emission profile,
hydroelectric projects.186
Massachusetts environmental groups opposed even transmitting
hydropower to Massachusetts for fear that transmission might be a first step
to altering the state’s renewable power standard to credit hydroelectricity
from Quebec.187
C. Solution: Federal Supervision of Exported State Energy Regulation
To preserve the benefits of state leadership on energy policy as well as
the benefits of integrated national energy markets, the federal government
must supervise exported state regulation. Specifically, Congress should
direct FERC, with input from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
to authorize state regulations that are nondiscriminatory and do not threaten
to splinter interstate markets.188 Several alternative mechanisms could
work, but ideally FERC should be required to review and approve, modify,
or reject all exported energy regulations within 180 days of a state
application for authorization, subject to judicial review. The dormant
Commerce Clause is an inference from congressional silence, so
congressional authorization would insulate approved regulation from
constitutional attack.189
To institute FERC review, Congress should provide a prospective date on
which state exported energy regulations would be preempted.190 The date
should leave sufficient time for FERC to review state applications and
approve their renewable power standards, low-carbon fuel standards, and

186. Scott Thistle, LePage Continues Effort to Lower Energy Costs for Maine
Ratepayers,
BANGOR
DAILY
NEWS
(Jan.
7,
2014,
7:46
PM),
http://bangordailynews.com/2014/01/05/politics/lepage-continues-effort-to-lower-energycosts-for-maine-ratepayers.
187. Editorial, Gains Outweigh the Costs for Hydropower from Quebec, BOS. GLOBE
(Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/09/15/hydropowerfrom-quebec-worth-pursuing-despite-concerns-about-power-lines/oPe8tp1ZLCH9
kqM9eEqH6O/story.html (recommending that the transmission be approved but the
renewable power standard not be changed to ensure the health of Massachusetts’
“burgeoning wind and solar sectors”).
188. Pursuant to congressional authorization agencies may authorize or preempt state
regulation. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (authorize); Jim Chen, A
Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1790 (2004) (authorize); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency
Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 524–25 (2012) (preempt).
189. See S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87–88 (1984); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421–40 (1946).
190. The statute should preempt “all state regulation of fuel, electricity, or other products
within an energy supply chain that is predicated on the out-of-state consequences of
producing or consuming that fuel or electricity.”
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environmental assessment laws.191 Given the complexity of FERC’s task, it
should also be given authority to extend the preemption drop-dead date if it
falls behind in its review of state legislation.
The scale of FERC’s proposed review, while significant, is not
particularly unusual in the context of energy and environmental regulation.
Under the Clean Air Act’s cooperative federalism framework, the EPA
must review and approve comprehensive state plans for addressing several
different pollutants subject to statutory deadlines.192 In fact, in the coming
years, the EPA will have to review state renewable power standards anyway
to determine whether those standards meet its forthcoming Clean Air Act
standards for greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel–fired
power plants.193 FERC’s review of state energy regulations could be
coordinated with the EPA’s review of those standards under the Clean Air
Act.194
This reform also would not significantly expand federal supervision of
state energy laws. State energy laws limited to in-state emissions would not
be preempted.195 For example, state emission standards, energy efficiency
standards, and incentive programs would not be affected.196 Further, if
states adjusted their renewable power standards to address in-state
electricity production, only renewable power standards that focus on
nationwide emissions associated with in-state consumption of electricity
would be subject to FERC review.197 As a result, the laws reviewed by
FERC would be the laws otherwise subject to review in federal court.

191. Because Congress undoubtedly has the power to preempt state regulation of
interstate energy markets, this mechanism does not present a preclearance concern. See
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013).
192. Ann E. Carlson, The President, Climate Change, and California, 126 HARV. L. REV.
156, 158–59 (2013) (arguing that California’s cap-and-trade system should qualify as a state
standard under 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)).
193. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)
(providing for EPA review of a state plan that “establishes standards of performance for any
existing source”).
194. The federal agencies have proven successful at coordinating policies across different
agencies in response to climate change. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s
National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 347
(2011) (describing collaboration of EPA and the Department of Transportation); see also
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1131 (2012).
195. See supra note 190 (stating the proposed text of preemption clause).
196. States have adopted numerous regulations and incentive programs that apply to instate sources from buildings to appliances to agricultural and industrial sources. Pace Law
Sch. Ctr. for Envtl. Legal Studies, The State Response to Climate Change: 50-State Survey,
in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 371 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007); see also
Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and
Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1017 (2006).
197. If a state chose not to submit an arguably preempted plan to FERC for review, it
could, of course, be invalidated by a federal preemption lawsuit.
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States would simply exchange judicial review for an expert administrative
reviewer.198
Although federal courts considering dormant Commerce Clause
challenges commonly resolve questions of discrimination and market
splintering, often labeled “Balkanization,”199 judicial review under the
dormant Commerce Clause is a very blunt tool for policing state regulation
of imported fuel and electricity.
Substantively, Baldwin and the
extraterritoriality cases forbid all regulation of commodities based on how
they were produced out of state.200 This rule seems appropriate for state
laws forbidding imports from states with inconsistent minimum wage
standards or labor laws, but it is too restrictive for innovative state energy
programs.
First, many of these regulations target greenhouse gas emissions, which
have the same effect on global warming no matter where they are
emitted.201 State competition may impose some economic disincentive to
regulate water pollution,202 but even if regulating states lose industry and
jobs, they will retain the benefit of clean water. In contrast, when states
burden their domestic industry with climate regulations, competition will
also destroy the environmental benefits of their regulation: in addition to
losing jobs, increased out-of-state greenhouse gas emissions mean they will
face the same harm from global warming.203 The EPA’s forthcoming rules
for state power sector emissions may somewhat mitigate this problem by
limiting each state’s power sector emissions, which theoretically should
restrain industry from fleeing to neighboring states.204 But the plan does
not hold all states to the same standard and leaves the most-polluting states

198. This choice would, of course, be consistent with settled administrative law doctrine
that technical questions of policy are best resolved by agencies rather than courts. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984) (“[T]he
principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently followed by this
Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected
to agency regulations.” (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961) (internal
quotation omitted))).
199. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
200. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392–93
(1994); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524 (1935).
201. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 10–11.
202. But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1229 (1992) (arguing that competition leads to improved regulation of environmental
harms with local impacts); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997) (same).
203. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text; see also Brewster, supra note 79, at 247
(“[I]f higher environmental regulation in one nation leads to increased production of carbonheavy goods elsewhere, then the reductions in one nation may be offset or nullified
completely by greenhouse gas production in other parts of the globe.”).
204. Carbon Pollution Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014).
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with the loosest standards—leaving plenty of room for industry to flee
regulating states.205
Second, addressing the competitiveness problem posed by climate
regulation is the most pressing dilemma for subglobal energy regulation:
How can national climate regulations encourage rather than discourage
action elsewhere?206 If states may not adopt regulations that mitigate the
competitiveness concern, they will be largely useless as a model for the
federal government or other governments around the world, forfeiting the
benefits of states’ traditional role as laboratories of democracy for energy
Despite the protectionist temptation, some of the state
policy.207
regulations, while extraterritorial, impose only a minimal burden on
commerce in other states. For example, Minnesota’s limitation on
electricity from new coal-fired plants in North Dakota is even-handed and
leaves plenty of room for continuing electricity trade with all existing
power plants in North Dakota and nearly all future plants.208 Some room
for this kind of even-handed regulation of imported fuel and electricity is
necessary so long as it does not splinter interstate markets, and FERC
should have the power to authorize it.
At the same time, the mere fact that out-of-state greenhouse gas
emissions affect climate around the world, and in the regulating state,
cannot justify a blanket authorization of extraterritorial state climate
regulations. Discriminatory regulations are plainly problematic because
they will quickly carve the national energy market into fifty isolated
enclaves.209 But even-handed regulations may also have this effect if they
are totally unchecked. For example, imagine that North Carolina chose to
implement a 100 percent hydropower renewable power standard. This
regulation would be nondiscriminatory—it would apply equally to in-state
and out-of-state sources—but practically speaking, it would turn North
Carolina into an electricity island because utilities in neighboring states
205. Phillip Wallach & Alex Abdun-Nabi, The EPA’s Carbon Plan Asks the Least from
States That Pollute the Most, WASH. POST (July 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/07/16/the-epas-carbon-plan-asks-the-least-from-states-thatpollute-the-most. Some key coal power plants, such as those that export electricity to
California, are located on tribal land that is not covered by the new EPA standards.
Cullenward, supra note 80, at 7.
206. See generally Coleman, supra note 4; see also Daniel A. Farber, Carbon Leakage
Versus Policy Diffusion: The Perils and Promise of Subglobal Climate Action, 13 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 359, 362–67 (2013).
207. These benefits are particularly crucial in the arena of climate and energy policy
where federal policy is unsettled. See, e.g., Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal
Preemption and the Clean Energy Floor, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (criticizing
preemption of state energy regulation that is more protective of the environment than federal
law); Adelman & Engel, supra note 64, at 1834–35 (advocating less preemption of local
regulation, even for national and international problems).
208. For more detail, see infra notes 66–81 and accompanying text.
209. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (“If New York, in
order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers, may guard them against competition
with the cheaper prices of Vermont, the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that
were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the
nation.”).
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would have other power sources and North Carolina could not take their
electricity. Finally, if any climate impact could entirely negate dormant
Commerce Clause constraints, trade in other commodities could be
seriously impacted. For instance, transport of fruits and vegetables leads to
greenhouse gas emissions, but if a state could prevent the sale of produce
that required significant greenhouse gas emissions to reach its consumers,
national food markets would break down.210
Procedurally, transferring review of exported regulations from the courts
to FERC would bring significantly enhanced expertise to bear on the
conundrums posed by exported energy regulations. Whether these
regulations are even-handed and whether they would splinter energy
markets are questions that often turn on highly technical arguments that are
not well aligned with the expertise of the judiciary or modes of judicial
review.211 Indeed, the court tasked with resolving the dormant Commerce
Clause dispute between North Dakota and Minnesota asked the parties sua
sponte whether there was any way it could defer the decision to FERC.212
Ultimately, it concluded there was no way to avoid the decision.213 Courts
are not eager to resolve these disputes; they should be resolved by FERC.
Similarly, it would be unwise to simply abrogate the extraterritoriality test
for state energy regulation and continue relying on the courts to implement
a rump dormant Commerce Clause analysis, striking down state regulations
that were discriminatory or imposed excessive burdens on interstate
commerce.214
210. California’s low-carbon fuel standard adopted exactly this kind of analysis for
ethanol, punishing Midwestern ethanol producers for transporting their ethanol to California,
and punishing California ethanol producers for transporting their corn from the Midwest to
California. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088
(E.D. Cal. 2011).
211. This is consistent with the suggestion of numerous commentators that the new
challenges of energy and climate regulation are best resolved by expert agencies, not the
courts. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (arguing that courts should defer to agencies, which are best suited to
resolve problems presented by fracking and climate change); Douglas A. Kysar, What
Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 8–44 (2011) (arguing that courts
are an impractical forum for resolving climate change disputes); see also Matthew C.
Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice
Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1042–43 (2006) (describing the role
of agency expertise in determining when decisions should be entrusted to agencies).
212. See North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 11-3232, 2012 WL 4479246, at *3 (D. Minn.
Sept. 30, 2012).
213. Id. at *19.
214. The same criticism applies to other proposals to modify dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine to apply less searching review to state energy laws. See Kirsten H. Engel, The
Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case
of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999) (arguing for a broad dormant
Commerce Clause exemption for state-created environmental markets); Daniel A. Farber,
Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879 (2008) (arguing for
a strong presumption against invalidating state climate regulation on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds); Peter C. Felmly, Beyond the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV.
467, 512 (2003); Lee & Duane, supra note 85, at 355–62 (arguing for intermediate scrutiny,
market participant exception, and increased deference for state climate regulations);
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For example, imagine how a court would assess reciprocal dormant
Commerce Clause suits against two states with different scientific
assessments of the climate impact of natural gas and coal power. Natural
gas power plants burn cleaner than coal power plants, emitting far less
carbon dioxide, but natural gas production and transport emits methane,
another greenhouse gas, that offsets some of this benefit.215 The most
comprehensive literature surveys conclude that natural gas, on net, has a
smaller climate impact than coal,216 but there is a legitimate and active
scientific debate on this question, which may be the single most important
question for the nation’s climate future.217 Scientific opinions on the total
climate impact of natural gas stretch from those who say gas has only a
third of the climate impact of coal218 to those who say gas actually has a
larger impact.219 Now, imagine that a natural gas reliant state adopted a
cap-and-trade system that attributed a very large climate benefit to gas and a
neighboring coal-heavy state adopted a cap-and-trade system that labeled
natural gas worse than coal. Both states could point to a rigorous, peerreviewed scientific basis for their regulations—but how would a court
respond to dueling dormant Commerce Clause lawsuits against these capand-trade systems?
A court in this situation has few palatable options. Declaring one or both
of the statutes constitutionally invalid would require wading into an active
scientific debate. But leaving both in place would carve up interstate
energy markets as states adopt self-serving, but scientifically defensible,
characterizations of electricity generated in other states. The scientific
battle over gas versus coal is just one part of a constant scientific battle over
the climate benefits and drawbacks of nearly every energy source. If
scientists cannot even agree on the most basic issues, how can courts decide
whether one ethanol factory truly has a smaller climate impact than another
factory? Lifecycle analyses, like that contained in California’s low-carbon
fuel standard, vary so widely that states, relying on favorable published
Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1
(2003); Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 34, 65–67 (2009). It is also unlikely that the courts will
choose to incorporate an entirely separate climate factor into their already complex dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.
215. See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 31, at 786 n.43 (describing debate).
216. A. R. Brandt et al., Methane Leaks from North American Natural Gas Systems, 343
SCIENCE 733, 734 (2014).
217. For example, the widely reported drop in United States greenhouse gas emissions is
a result of the assumption that natural gas has a smaller climate impact than coal. U.S.
Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 2012, EIA.GOV (Oct.
21, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon (“The increase in natural gasfired generation, while coal-fired generation decreased, substantially reduced the carbon
intensity of electricity generation in 2012.”).
218. See Lawrence M. Cathles III et al., A Commentary on “The Greenhouse-Gas
Footprint of Natural Gas in Shale Formations” by RW Howarth, R. Santoro, and Anthony
Ingraffea, 113 CLIMATIC CHANGE 525, 533–34 (2012) (noting that “gas has less than half
and perhaps a third the greenhouse impact as coal”).
219. See Robert W. Howarth et al., Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of
Natural Gas from Shale Formations, 106 CLIMATIC CHANGE 679, 688 (2011).
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studies, could justify restricting imports from nearly any energy source. For
example, a recent Nature study stated that, under certain circumstances, the
land-use impacts of wind power could entirely wipe out its climate
benefit.220 Of course, a federal agency would not build its policy on such
an outlier view, regardless of the scientific rigor of the individual study.
But a court would have difficulty striking down state regulations grounded
on published scientific estimates, and that would be enough to justify
inconsistent laws that could quickly splinter interstate energy markets.
Nor do courts have the technical expertise to judge whether a given
renewable power standard would cut a state off from interstate electricity
markets to an unacceptable degree. All such standards will place some
burden on interstate commerce, so a balance needs to be struck reflecting
federal policy on the need for both integrated energy markets and state
innovation in energy regulation. And that balance should reflect the best
evidence of the impact of state regulations on interstate electricity trade.
For example, at what level of stringency do renewable power standards
amount to a de facto ban on import of electricity from neighboring states?
Do standards that prescribe percentages for each type of renewable power
isolate states at lower percentage goals? FERC has the expertise to address
these thorny questions and the courts do not.221
Although courts are experts at balancing state and federal power, FERC
also has the ability and the duty to consider the federalism dimensions of
authorization and preemption questions. When federal agency regulation
has an impact on state authority, the agency must consider its federalism
implications and must issue a Federalism Impact Statement under Executive
Order 13,132.222 Furthermore, FERC has already been entrusted with
implementing the cooperative federalism provisions of the Environmental
Policy Act of 2005, which authorizes FERC to preempt state authority and
approve facilities for “interstate electric transmission” if states are delaying

220. Jo Smith et al., Avoid Constructing Wind Farms on Peat, 489 NATURE 33 (2012).
Similarly rigorous but outlier studies have from time to time been published, finding strong
climate impacts from other technologies thought to be low carbon. See, e.g., Ethan S. Warner
& Garvin A. Heath, Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Nuclear Electricity
Generation: Systematic Review and Harmonization, 16 J. OF INDUS. ECOL. S73 (2012).
221. This conclusion is consistent with an established literature on the benefits of
delegating technical questions to an expert agency. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
222. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999). Assuming that agencies have validly
been delegated Congress’s power to authorize or preempt, agency action already satisfies the
formal requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause,
respectively. However, to the extent that one wishes to use those clauses to protect the spirit
(rather than merely the letter) of “our federalism,” agencies have a mandate to consider that
spirit in making authorization and preemption decisions. Id. But see John F. Manning,
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV.
2003 (2009) (arguing that judicial protection for federalism must be based in text, rather than
the purposes, of the Constitution).
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critical projects that are consistent with “sound national energy policy.”223
Thus, FERC has authority to address both the technical and the federalism
aspects of the energy-policy-innovation versus market-integration dilemma.
Finally, alternative modes of addressing this dilemma are unlikely to be
effective. For example, while interstate compacts may be very useful for
addressing regional dilemmas like those presented by interstate
waterways,224 they would be less helpful in addressing a problem that, like
climate change, links all states. To devise a consensual imported electricity
policy, California would have to coordinate with Arizona, and Arizona
would have to coordinate with New Mexico, and New Mexico would have
to coordinate with Colorado. Furthermore, regulation of imported fossil
fuels would touch noncontiguous states across the country: this is why
Midwestern states filed arguments against California’s low-carbon fuel
standard.225 The problem requires national—rather than merely regional—
coordination.
IV. RECONCILING STATE REGULATION AND A NATIONAL MARKET
Once FERC is empowered to authorize or preempt state exported energy
regulations, it should use that authority to strike a balance between national
energy markets and state experimentation in energy policy. It should be
empowered to make rules or, alternatively, issue guidance that signals to
state lawmakers the boundaries of their authority in each of the three areas
of exported regulation: imported electricity, imported fuels, and exported
fuel and energy supply chains.
A. Imported Electricity
The two primary concerns regarding state regulation of imported
electricity are explicit discrimination and drastically inconsistent
evaluations of different power sources. Explicit discrimination is an easy
case: FERC should preempt discriminatory provisions. The only difficult
223. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2012) (as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005)); see also R. Seth Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption,
Commandeering, and the Values of Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of
EPAct, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 440–41 (2008) (arguing that the statute creates an effective
cooperative federalism regime). But see Stein, supra note 124, at 244 (arguing that FERC’s
power has been vitiated by the courts). The EPA, of course, has been given the task of
implementing numerous systems of cooperative federalism including the Clean Air Act’s
provisions for best available control technology at new industrial sources, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7475(a) (2012), and for performance standards for existing sources in specified categories.
Id. § 7411(d).
224. Mark S. Davis & Michael Pappas, Escaping the Sporhase Maze: Protecting State
Waters Within the Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REV. 175, 198–99 (2012) (discussing use of
compacts to exempt state authority from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny); see also
Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 754–58 & nn.57–68
(2010) (documenting fifty environmentally focused compacts concluded with other nations).
225. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 512–13 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“The states of Nebraska, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, Ohio,
and South Dakota (which are major producers of corn and ethanol) filed an amicus brief in
support of en banc rehearing.”).
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question is severability: Should FERC have the power to preempt portions
of state energy standards while leaving the rest intact? For example, if a
state legislature passed a renewable power standard only because it thought
that discrimination in favor of in-state power would create “green jobs,”226
then preempting that portion and authorizing the rest would arguably leave
the state with a policy that it would never have passed.227 To remedy this
problem, states should be encouraged to include a severability plan that lays
out their preferred response to federal preemption. If states do not offer
such a plan, FERC should preempt only the discriminatory portion of the
regulation to minimize disruption to state policy.228
Implicit discrimination is more complex. FERC should bracket state
authority to regulate imported electricity based on its source. First, FERC
should only allow states to address how electricity was produced in another
state if the differential treatment is based on climate impact. For example,
states should not have the authority to project their views of nuclear power
into neighboring states no matter how strongly those views are held.229
That kind of extraterritorial regulation would be just as problematic as
limiting trade based on the wage paid to out-of-state workers—only the
entirely cross-border harm of climate change can justify regulating the outof-state supply chain of a commodity like electricity.230 Second, FERC,
employing a science advisory committee and the best science, should
establish boundaries on states’ assessments of different power sources,
rejecting outlier views and establishing a hierarchy of power sources based
on their climate impact.231 This would ensure that states employ broadly
consistent standards that would allow integrated markets.

226. Farrell, supra note 184.
227. This is the result that courts try to avoid when severing a partially unconstitutional
state statute. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330
(2006) (“[W]e must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statute
to no statute at all?”).
228. This is also the preference of the courts. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 504 (1985) (“[T]he normal rule [is] that partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the
required course.”).
229. In practice this could mean requiring states to count nuclear electricity generated in
other states toward compliance with the state’s renewable power standard.
230. Of course, a nuclear accident could harm residents in a neighboring state just as a
coal-fired facility across the border could harm neighboring states’ air quality or a wind farm
could harm migratory birds. States have a legitimate interest in their neighbor states’
environmental policies, but that does not give them authority to regulate with the aim of
changing those policies. The contours of state authority over actions in neighboring states
are set by the interaction of preexisting state and federal laws. For example, state regulation
of nuclear power plants based on radiological safety is preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.
See Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 422 (1st Cir. 2013). State
common law nuisance actions against industrial facilities in neighboring states are
preempted by the Clean Water Act. See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500
(1987). States should not be allowed to leverage their energy policies to punish energy
sources that they are disabled from regulating.
231. This proposal is consistent with that of other scholars who have suggested that
FERC should use its authority to decarbonize the electricity sector. STEVEN WEISSMAN &
ROMANY WEBB, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION, VOLUME 2: FERC
(July 2014), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ccelp/FERC_Report_FINAL.pdf.

2014]

IMPORTING ENERGY, EXPORTING REGULATION

1397

B. Imported Fuel
Regulation of imported fuel raises the same issues and requires similar
solutions. FERC should preempt explicit discrimination, and remedy
implicit discrimination, by placing outer boundaries based on the best
science available on the climate impact that can be attributed to out-of-state
fuels. Thus, the basic structure of California’s low-carbon fuel standard
should be authorized, but California’s discriminatory treatment of out-ofstate heavy oil should be preempted,232 and it should be required to regulate
ethanol either nationally or by facility rather than breaking out California
fuel for specifically favorable treatment.233
Imported fuel, however, presents two additional problems. First, some of
the out-of-state emissions that comprise a fuel’s carbon intensity are the
emissions required to transport the fuel and its components in interstate
commerce.234 Attaching a penalty to movement in interstate commerce is
the archetypal violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, so this portion of
carbon intensity scores should be preempted. It is one thing for a state to
even-handedly regulate production emissions across the country; it is an
entirely different matter to impose a virtual tax on all transport across the
country. States should not be allowed to adopt regulations designed to slow
interstate commerce.
Second, worldwide supply chains mean that much of the petroleum
production regulated by a low-carbon fuel standard is foreign. Thus, when
states regulate imported fuels based on how they were produced states are
regulating emissions in other countries, setting U.S. trade policy, and are
likely violating international trade law.235 States should not be allowed to
“embroil the National Government” in trade disputes.236 Instead, FERC
should preempt state regulation of imported fuels from other countries.237
232. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, No. CV-F-09-2234 LJO DLB, slip
op. at *17–21 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011) (order granting summary adjudication motion for
National Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n).
233. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1086–87 (E.D.
Cal. 2011).
234. Id. at 1088.
235. Generally nations may not attach conditions to domestic sales that attempt to control
the “process and production methods” of their trading partners. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. For instance, in one
important case, the World Trade Organization appellate body held that the U.S. could not
prohibit the importation of shrimp from countries that did not take steps to prevent turtles
from being endangered by shrimp fishing. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); see
also Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155 (Sept.
3, 1991) (rejecting U.S. restrictions on tuna imports from nations that did not adequately
protect dolphins from drowning by tuna fishermen); Wu & Salzman, supra note 136, at 404–
05. For more on the overlap between the dormant Commerce Clause and international trade
law, see Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1994).
236. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 383 (2000) (striking down
Massachusetts limitation on imports from Burma).
237. Canada has already complained that California’s low-carbon fuel standard violates
trade law. Scott Haggett, New California Fuel Rule May Violate NAFTA: Lawyer,
REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/25/us-fuels-trade-
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But what about foreign fuels that would be favored by a low-carbon fuel
standard because they are produced by low-carbon methods abroad?238
FERC should ensure that these sources are given the opportunity to opt in to
state standards, which would allow states to encourage imports of foreign
fuels that they believe to be beneficial to the environment.
C. Exported Fuel and Energy Supply Chains
FERC will necessarily and appropriately have less power to supervise
state regulation of fossil fuel export and cross-state shipments of energy
products.239 Fossil fuels and the kinds of machinery used in the energy
industry generally will have at least some potential impact on the state
environment.240 As a result, states have authority to control shipments of
these products to avoid these impacts. But FERC can nevertheless issue
guidance to ward off abuses of that legitimate state authority.
First, FERC should make clear that state environmental assessments may
not focus on out-of-state environmental impacts unless (1) it is done by
agreement with the other state or (2) it has adopted safeguards to ensure an
even-handed consideration of climate impacts in all state decisions. There
is every temptation to attach a strict climate test to projects enabling out-ofstate fuel industries while ignoring emissions associated with in-state
industry.241 This limitation would provide room for a limited consideration
of the climate impact of state decisions without threatening retaliation and
Balkanization.
Second, while affording wide latitude to state regulation of local impacts,
FERC should preempt state regulations that are obviously aimed at
disrupting industries in other states. For example, FERC should carefully
scrutinize blanket prohibitions on export facilities and oil pipelines. The
Energy Policy Act of 2005’s242 treatment of state transmission siting
idUSTRE53O0NO20090425 (reporting complaints from Canadian trade officials and the
former head of the Canadian Bar Association that “California’s new low-carbon fuel rules
may be a violation of NAFTA and World Trade Organization provisions”).
238. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013).
239. Regan, supra note 170, at 1258 (noting greater latitude for regulation of state
exports).
240. Environmental groups have been wise to focus on these local impacts, such as coal
dust, Sierra Club v. BNSF Railway Co., No. 1:13-cv-00272-LRS, 2014 WL 53309, at *3
(E.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2014), spill risk, Shaffer, supra note 118, and blowing petroleum coke,
Sfondeles, supra note 123.
241. Compare Remarks by the President on Climate Change, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (June 25,
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climatechange (stating that Keystone XL crude pipeline would not be approved if it would
“significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution”), with MICHAEL J. WALSH,
NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12 (2012), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2
/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_12_2012.pdf (environmental analysis that accompanies
domestic crude pipelines makes no mention of climate change); see also Sierra Club v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26 & n.13 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction against domestic crude oil pipeline because it, unlike Keystone XL,
“is an entirely domestic pipeline”).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005)).
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authority may be a good model for FERC’s authority: respecting the
principle of cooperative federalism, FERC should preempt state siting
authority over crude pipelines if, and only if, a permit is being unreasonably
delayed.243
CONCLUSION
U.S. energy policy is at a turning point. Imminent decisions by
companies and regulators will determine U.S. energy policy for decades to
come. State experiments with innovative energy policies play a crucial role
in determining what policies will help the country rise to this challenge.
But the riddle that states are being asked to solve—climate regulation—is a
global problem that plays out over increasingly integrated national and
international energy markets. State energy policy experiments are also
fertile ground for protectionist measures that would at best forfeit the
efficiency and reliability benefits of integrated energy markets, and at
worst, could ignite state-to-state and even international trade wars.
Congress should preserve the benefits of state experimentation, while
protecting free trade in energy markets, by authorizing the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission to supervise state regulation of energy production
in other states.

243. Davis, supra note 223, at 440–41.

